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Abstract
This thesis discusses the present trends of population change in Japan, and 
the government’s reactions to it in terms of policy. Theoretically and 
methodologically, the thesis brings together a number of different types of 
material: demographic statistics on Japan’s current aging and declining population 
and its history; social science discussions of the effects of aging on rural 
communities; the current situation in relation to immigration, and how far this can 
make up for the decline in population; and policy documents on the response of 
the Japanese government and society over the years.
The first chapter presents the theoretical model, and deals with the increase 
in old age life expectancy and the welfare system; the declining birth rate and its 
relation to costs of children; the problems of depopulation and the declining labor 
force, and the problems of government expenditure limiting policy options.
The second chapter deals in greater details with the dynamics of population 
decline, including the problems of the rural areas, the responses of the family to 
aging and population decline, and the possibility of immigration.
Chapter 3 concentrates on the history and present patterns of immigration in 
Japan, from the Edo period to the present, and the distribution and characteristics 
of the immigrant population at present: groups discussed include the Koreans, 
Chinese, Filipinos and Nikkeijin from Latin America.
Chapter 4 discusses government and citizen responses to population change, 
including both local and central government initiatives, and informal initiatives 
from citizens’ groups and Non-Governmental Organizations.
x
The conclusion in chapter 5 notes that none of the government policies to 
deal with the problems of population decline and aging have fully produced the 
desired results, and suggests that future solutions may lie in more open borders 
and greater regionalization. 
xi
Chapter 1. Introduction 
“Human Capital will soon rival – and may even surpass financial capital as the  
critical economic engine of the future” (World Economic Forum 2010: 7)
“Japan must create an environment where foreigners can actively participate in  
economic and social activities. […] The government must open Japan's doors to  
people from around the globe so that they can display their ability in this  
country” (Nippon Keidanren 2003: 7)
1.0 Introduction
Demographic change is a global issue. Every country is only as great as its 
people. Demographic development and changes in age composition of a society 
arise from a variety of factors, including armed conflict, changing birth rates and 
advances in medical technology and distribution. Japan’s population is among the 
oldest and most rapidly aging in the world, and the birth rate among the lowest. 
This has produced a crisis in the taxation, welfare and pension systems: there are 
an increasing number of people in need of care and a decreasing number of 
workers earning the money to pay for  it.
Japan's National Institute of Population and Social Security Research says 
that one in five Japanese is already over 65, and by 2035, one in three will belong 
to this age cohort (see Table 1). As Japan’s population began to decline around 
2007 after a prolonged period of diminished fertility and increasing longevity, it 
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undergoes an unprecedented qualitative change in its composition. 
Table 1. Projected future population, proportion by the major three age groups (under 15, 15-64 
and 65 and over) and age structure coefficient: [Medium-variant fertility (with Medium-variant 
mortality)]
Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 84).
Not only the numerical loss of people, but also the continuing increase in the 
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proportion of elderly citizens and subsequent challenges related to the long-term 
financial sustainability of its pension and healthcare system threaten the future of 
Japan. However, the looming change stretches beyond the lack of bodies. 
Companies face losing significant numbers of their most experienced workers in 
retirement or to other businesses, their special – even unique – skills, training and 
qualifications. Talent shortages and a substantial loss of knowledge and 
experience in more and more sectors may be the result. Against this background, 
companies are facing tight labor markets on the one hand and having to consider 
what kinds of people to employ in the future on the other.
Immigrants, who could partly compensate for the lack of national 
reproduction, do not come to Japan in large numbers, partly because of the 
country’s restrictive immigration laws. Immigration has a rejuvenating effect on 
the population as people moving here are generally younger than those going 
abroad. However, since 2008 Japan’s immigration balance has been negative 
(OECD 2011: 294-95). More people are leaving the country than entering it. The 
government blames the economic crisis for this, and the lack of domestic jobs. 
Compared with similar developed countries, relatively few qualified people have 
come to Japan during this period: a small number of foreigners have been allowed 
to settle permanently in the last few years, nowhere near enough to offset the 
estimated shortage of people with sought after educational qualifications such as 
engineers and geriatric nurses. The dearth of semi-skilled workers is also hardly 
encouraging. People suspect that the decline in the number of foreigners coming 
into Japan is not just a temporary setback, and after Fukushima, many highly-
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skilled people – Japanese and resident foreigners alike – have begun looking for 
jobs in neighboring countries (cf. Hayashi and Maeji 2011). Sakanaka Hidenori 
(2005) – a former director of Tokyo's Immigration Bureau – fears that the 
demographic decline and the subsequent inability or unwillingness of the national 
government to cope could irreversibly reduce its vitality and (economic) 
prosperity.
According to estimates in a much-quoted report on replacement migration 
published by the United Nations (United Nations Population Division 2001), 
between 2000 and 2050, Japan would need 647,000 immigrants per annum, a total 
of 32.3 million, to stabilize its quantitative labor force at the current height, or to 
maintain an elderly support rate of 3.0, it would need an additional immigrant 
stock of almost 95 million (1.9 million per annum)1. As the primary baby boom 
generation born between 1947 and 1949 retires, more people are leaving than 
entering the domestic labor market. In March 2011, the potential labor force stood 
at around 62 million, of which 59.28 million people were employed (Statistical 
Bureau 2011).
Despite the prerequisites set by the immigration law and the position of the 
government that only skilled workers should be allowed in, there has still been a 
flow of undocumented migrants, working in the construction sector and similar 
industries, often organized by the local yakuza.
However, as traditional migration theories suggest, people migrate in the 
face of push/pull factors. If conditions deteriorate in a limited area or on a national 
1 In the former case its total population would increase to 150.7 million, while in the latter case it 
would increase to 229 million, almost double the current size. But as will be argued in this 
thesis, even today’s Japan has difficulties to attract more foreign labor.
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level, people try to improve their livelihood by moving away in large numbers, 
and they often congregate as minorities in a particular destination. Historically, 
foreigners in Japan were not only unwelcome as supplementary labor, but also 
often object of political calculation and target of ethnic and racial discrimination. 
Some fear that social tension will rise if Japan does not manage this process of 
integration quickly and solve the problems, despite the costs.
Theoretically, therefore, this thesis tries to bring together a number of bodies 
of literature which are usually considered separately, from history, demography, 
sociology and anthropology, to discuss the reasons for Japan’s population decline 
and aging society, the effects throughout Japan in different prefectures, and in the 
rural and urban areas, and the policies adopted by national and local governments 
in response to this. The variables I will discuss are: 
• The increase in life expectancy
• The welfare system
• The birth rate
• The cost of education and upbringing
• Rural depopulation 
• Government expenditure
• Immigration
• Competition from outside
The relations between these are shown in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1. Relationship of main variables in theoretical model
The relations between these elements are discussed in the following section, 
after a brief discussion of literature and methodology. As will be seen below, this 
thesis is based mainly on library sources and publications available on line. The 
problem with dealing with the Japanese economy is that there are several different 
bodies of literature relevant to the problem. First, there is a large amount of 
demographic work on the Japanese population and its decline, as represented in 
the studies by Kaneko et al. Many of the key diagrams of population pyramids 
and the populations of regions and prefectures are taken from this work, and key 
tables have been included in the appendices. Second, there is a large body of 
historical work dealing with movements of migrants in and out of Japan, 
including for instance the major studies of the Korean population by Weiner (e.g. 
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1993). Thirdly, there is a developing literature on the population and migration 
policies of the Japanese government, represented both by the official sources from 
Ministries in Tokyo, and commentary (often critical) by sociologists including 
Nagy, Pak and others. Fourth, there is now a considerable literature on 
depopulation of the rural areas and its social effects, by anthropologists such as 
Traphagen (2003), Thompson (2003), Knight (2003), Burgess (2008), Faier 
(2009) and others. Finally, there is now a very large body of information from 
anthropologists on the increasing number of migrant minorities within Japan, 
which are becoming very well documented. This includes the outstanding work on 
the Chinese by Liu-Farrer (2010), the Koreans by Ryang (1996) and Fukuoka 
(2000), the Nikkeijin by Tsuda (2003), and the Filipinos by Faier (2009). In this 
thesis I have attempted to bring these different strands of the literature together to 
create a picture of the current state of migration and migration policy in the 
country, and its likely success in heading off population decline.
1.1 Increase of old age life expectancy and the welfare system
The emergence of Japan’s highly aged groups is predicated upon several 
factors that will be explained in the following paragraph.
First of all, with the introduction of a general healthcare system, Japan was 
able to decrease its infant mortality rates from one of the highest in Asia to one of 
the lowest worldwide. As illustrated in Table 2, in 1950, 60.1 children per 1,000 
live births children did not reach their first birthday, since then it constantly 
declined to 2.4 in 2009. In particular, farmers and other inhabitants of the rural 
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areas often did not have the means to protect their children against illnesses via 
inoculation and hospitals were spread sparsely across the country. Unlike modern 
times with 222.3 physicians (nurses an assistant nurses: 980.7) per 100,000 
citizens, that number was much lower in the early postwar years (Statistical 
Bureau 2010: 172)2. People often had to travel long distances to bring their 
children to a hospital, often not in time. However, after 1945 with the introduction 
of its current healthcare system, these mortality numbers dwindled drastically, as 
can be seen in Table 2, with new hospitals built across the country and declining 
treatment costs.
Table 2. Vital Statistics
Source: Statistical Bureau (2010: 13).
2 “While the number of physicians providing healthcare is increasing nationwide, their uneven 
distribution has become a problem due to the lack of physicians specializing in certain areas of 
medicine and the lack of physicians operating in regional parts of the country.” (Statistical 
Bureau 2010: 172).
8
Secondly, due to its resource scarcity, people are Japan’s primary source of 
economic prosperity. As prosperity rose and the birthrate declined, the public and 
private sector acted accordingly to improve the general health of the people. 
Smoking, for example - once a sign of achievement and independence - was 
increasingly regarded as health risk. However, as the influence of Western cuisine 
has increased, so also have obesity rates increased in Japan. There is growing 
health consciousness (e.g. in relation to smoking, alcohol) in all age cohorts, 
despite the recent increase in the incidence of obesity. Respiratory illnesses related 
to production which once were a burden for the public, have now been reduced, as 
the government has promoted the change to a green Japan. Environmental 
regulations were introduced, and government became conscious of the problems 
caused e.g. by pollution in production processes, as the 1970s led to the spread of 
diseases such as Minamata disease, itai itai disease, and Yokaiichi asthma 
(McKean 1983, George 2006). Military disarmament meant the end of the military 
campaigns – particularly the Second World War – which had emptied the ranks of 
young men in prewar Japan. Economic prosperity and the absence of war allowed 
the underlying trends that were brought about by better hygiene and other factors 
to become more visible. National access to affordable healthcare at first decreased 
infant mortality, high by western standards, and this was eventually supplemented 
by increasing life expectancy to provide a longer, healthier life after retirement. 
Famines and starvation which had been a feature of the prewar period in some 
regions disappeared after land reform. The advances in medical technology in the 
developed countries since 1945, coupled with the effective delivery of medical 
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services in Japan, resulted in increasing life expectancy, while the high-speed 
economic growth which began in the 1950s also contributed to a fall in the birth 
rate. 
As a result, financial experts now warn of a collapse of the social security 
system. The causes of population decline are varied and the influence of 
politicians over these factors is limited. The aging of the population becomes 
more pronounced as the numbers and proportions of the young and elderly groups 
move in opposite directions: there is an increasingly small number of young 
people, and an increasing number of old people. The age pyramids in Figure 2 
illustrate the aging of Japan for the future.
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Figure 2. Population pyramid: Medium fertility (with Medium mortality) variant
Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 90).
This development is apparently due to an avoidance of procreation, and 
cohabitation frequencies for married and unmarried couples are at an all-time low 
(marital sex about 40 times a year), often attributed to long working hours.
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Figure 3. Proportion of sexlessness among married couples by age group
Source: Sato et al. (2008: 14).
The key problem of future population change therefore does not arise only 
from decreasing size, but also from its changing age structure. From a simplistic 
viewpoint, we have a situation where we have an aging population, a dropping 
birth rate in most prefectures, and no comprehensive strategy to respond to that. 
Since the 1960s, the period during which the average person draws a pension has 
doubled, and the size of pensions has also increased, which culminates in a higher 
burden than ever before. The baby boomers who dedicated their lives to the rise of 
the world’s second – now third – largest economy, through their retirement, are 
leaving the country with a serious problem. Rising numbers of divorces further 
accelerate the process, as procreation outside of marriages is still rare and 
pregnancies often result in wedlock marriages, or in other words: “Given the rise 
of the divorce rate among mature couples in Japan, marriage can no longer 
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provide a guarantee of long term care by the spouse or children in old age” 
(Yamashita 2008: 167).
1.2 The declining birth rate and costs of children
In Japan, in relation to the number of children a woman has during her life, 
significant differences can be identified between the generations. Reproductive 
behavior is dependent on several factors, including forms of contraception 
available, women’s employment, and the financial conditions of a life with or 
without children.
Japan’s nonphysical infrastructure, in terms of human resources, is 
crumbling away and the future appears bleak at best. It requires a birth rate of 2.1 
children per women for the population to remain stable, and a higher rate if it is to 
increase (United Nations Population Division 2001). The reasons for the decline 
of the birth rate are well known: the readily availability of abortion and several 
contraceptives after the Second World War, the absence of the pronatal 
propaganda seen during the militarist period, and the high-speed economic growth 
from the 1950s have all contributed.
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Figure 4. Number of births and total fertility rate (1947 – 2005)
Source: Sato et al (2008: 4).
The wane of arranged marriages and societally preferred role models has 
allowed women more freedom in their choice of partner and employment, and 
reproductive behavior and frequency in general: sexual intercourse and 
conception is no longer only controlled by the husband, but by the wife as well, 
ultimately giving both partners control over the number of children, time of birth 
and a variety of options for family planning, as can be seen in Figure 5. The 
number of women who never used contraceptives declined from around 65 to less 
than 20 percent over the last 50 years, while the combined majority – over 70 
14
percent - of married Japanese women are nowadays either current or past users.
Figure 5. Contraceptive use among married women
Source: Sato et al. (2008: 11). 
The widespread improvement of secondary and tertiary education was 
accompanied by the introduction of freely available family planning and 
information (Coleman 1992). As the economy grew in the 1950s and 1960s, there 
was a decline in the proportion of families with more than three children, and the 
family with one or two children became the socially acceptable norm. This was 
coupled with an increase in marriage age (1950: groom 25.9, bride 23.0; 2009: 
groom 30.4, bride 28.6 years) (Statistical Bureau 2010: 16)3. There has also been 
3 Number of divorces in 2009: 253,000.
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the growing independence of children, and their increased mobility, with serious 
implications for the future well-being of their parents. As children moved to the 
cities, a larger proportion of the elderly stayed in the smaller towns and the rural 
areas, particularly in the north of the country. Some social classes, such as male 
farmers in the rural areas who are eldest sons, have found it increasingly difficult 
to find wives, leading to them either remaining bachelors, or finding wives outside 
the country. From the 1970s, the phenomenon of Japayuki – women from the 
Philippines and elsewhere in Southeast Asia, many of whom were coming to 
Japan hoping to marry – has been a feature of migration, and some rural areas 
now have significant proportions of these women maintaining the rural social 
structure (Faier 2010). “There is a positive correlation between income level and 
the probability of marriage, particularly for males” (Toyota 2008: 166).
The increasing competitiveness of the school system in terms of academic 
achievement has resulted in parents spending more money on their children’s 
education, including evening classes provided by the juku that specialize in 
getting children through examinations to high school and university, and has 
increased the costs of education for many families, also putting pressure on them 
to reduce family size. However modern family policy could exacerbate the central 
demographic problem – chronic childlessness – even further. This is clear from 
the age of mothers when they have their first children. In the 1960s and 1970s of 
the last century, it stood at around 25. In 2009, the average age climbed to 29. 
This trend increases the risk of remaining childless. 
Women’s increasing integration into the labor market has also led to a drop 
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in both the marriage and the birth rates. As the equality of sexes has increased, 
many women have been unwilling to remain as only housewives, and have had 
less children as a result. Parallel to the decrease in the average number of children, 
the share of women who remain childless has permanently increased. More 
importantly, therefore, is the drastic decrease in the number of births, which has 
become irreversible, while, as several scholars pointed out, small nuclear families 
have gradually became the predominant and most popular norm, and even these 
are starting to disappear. As in other highly developed countries, many couples do 
not get married at all, but simply cohabit – and tend not to have children. Millions 
of young people in Japan find themselves supported by their wealthier parents and 
live at home into their 20s, the so-called “parasite singles”. The number of 
potential parents has been reduced in the last three decades to such an extent that 
further serious birth declines are inevitable. Many people prefer their material 
comfort over having a family. The long economic recession since 1990 has 
increased this trend in Japan: people are living within their means, and with 
decreased earning potential, they tend to have lower numbers of children. The 
opportunity costs of having children have increased with the prolonged decline of 
Japanese economy, leading to stagnant wages, and the need for two breadwinners 
instead of one.
When they were set up in the postwar period, the social security and pension 
systems were based on the paradigm of numerous youngsters and a limited group 
of old people with relatively low expectation of life (the old age support rate), but 
the age pyramid has changed drastically in shape, from a pyramid to coffin as 
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noted above. In Japan, the dependency ratio in the next few years will continue to 
rise (see the figures for potential support ratio in Appendix 16). This development 
is set to make the cost of pension and health care to rise sharply. This is a huge 
challenge when one considers that the national debt already exceeds 100 percent 
of GDP (net value) (Rogers 2010). There is now a major cleavage in society 
between childless people/couples versus families with children in regard to 
current disposable income and future pensions, instead of a simplistic old vs. 
young. Generally families with children have lower disposable incomes and lower 
pension prospects, as the wife stops working to have children, and her lifetime 
income is reduced as a result. 
Government programs implemented to increase the birth rate have had little 
success so far. Despite the increase of child allowances, statistics show that 
parents spend about 37.6 percent - 1,982,000 yen - of their income on the 
education and related costs for their children, and the financial aid provided to 
families is a mere fraction of that (Japan Today 2010). With the introduction of the 
national healthcare and pension systems, children have gradually lost their 
economic value to their parents, and have instead become a drain on the family. In 
times of flexibility in terms of (un)employment and location, children act as 
irremovable anchors: people without children enjoy higher economic prosperity 
both while they work and in retirement, given that pensions are determined by 
income and number of years employed. In Japan, there are fewer and fewer 
families with multiple children and more and more university graduates without 
children.
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1.3 Rural depopulation 
As birthrates have declined and the expectation of life has increased, so has 
the population become concentrated in urban areas. The result is the depopulation 
of many of the smaller towns and rural areas, particularly in the more remote parts 
of the country. People have moved because of better labor opportunities and 
higher income in urban environments, the small size of the farms inherited from 
parents, better infrastructure and academic opportunities in the cities, and the 
availability of jobs in building projects, mostly located in already urbanized areas, 
and in the large sized industrial production sites which grew up after 1945. There 
is thus increased friction between a growing periphery and the major economic 
and administrative centers, including the Greater Tokyo area, which now produces 
25 percent of national economic output. In the rural areas there has been a process 
of fusion of administrative units (gappei), to make the administration of the 
declining population more economical. There are regions where people have left 
and are leaving, and where companies have difficulties to procure enough labor. 
The problem in Japan is the increasing gap between highly developed regions 
around the capital and the rest of the nation (cf. Tabb 1995: chapter 7). Aging 
mainly takes place in the countryside. Also this is a trend that other developed 
countries in Europe and the rest of East Asia will probably face in future. 
Particularly badly hit are the areas in the north of Japan, including Tohoku and 
Hokuriku, as Matanle notes for Niigata prefecture: “To put these figures into their 
national context, […] the 46 per cent decrease in Sado's population occurred at the 
same time as a 51 per cent increase in the population of Japan from approximately 
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84 million to 127.5 million between 1955 and 2005” (Matanle 2006: 151). As 
rural populations decline, so other services collapse: for instance, transport 
companies have been striving to adapt their services for a rapidly aging 
population, and reduced demand.
1.4 The problem of government expenditure
While today Japan is mostly indebted to its own population (foreign debts 
stand at around 5 percent), in the future public spending will not be a feasible 
option. At the end of January, 2011, the rating agency Standard & Poor's reduced 
the credit rating for Japan for the first time in years by one point, from previous 
AA to AA-, three levels below the top rating of AAA (Kajimoto 2011). Fitch did 
the same recently (White and Ishiguro 2011). However, unlike the United States 
or some European countries at the moment, Japan is not immediately threatened 
by insolvency.
There is also the problem of deflation: the Japanese government has tried 
for some time to keep it in check. Since the beginning of the 1990s, it has 
launched dozens of economic programs to stimulate the economy, so far without 
success. Instead, the Japanese public debt has risen to 104 percent of its GDP (net 
value) and with the volatile economic situation across the globe, interest rate are 
on the rise4. Japan has already ceded its position of second largest economy to 
China, and the financial burden related to the Fukushima incident and the Tohoku 
earthquake and tsunami is still increasing.
4 See for instance Rogers (2010).
20
1.5 Labor force and immigration
Japan’s response to its aging crisis has taken a number of forms. First, many 
companies have outsourced their production to other countries. This has some 
effect on reducing the demand for labor, but it hardly touches the problem of lack 
of people. 
Second, there has been a trend towards automation and the use of robots in 
industry, but as a general solution this would be expensive, and current and future 
generations of people still would face lower incomes. 
A third response is to raise the retirement age. Measures such as increasing 
the retirement age of a now healthy elderly population would increase the ratio 
between active workers and retired persons. This is already happening in some 
industries, e.g. the rise in the retirement age for professors in some of the major 
national universities, from 60 to 65 and beyond.
A fourth response is to export the problem of the aged. In fact there is some 
retirement migration, with countries such as Malaysia and Thailand opening their 
doors to rich pensioners from Japan and the West to come and settle in purpose 
built settlements (Miyasaki 2008, Ono 2008). If it is difficult to bring nurses to 
Japan, the elderly can go elsewhere. Retirement migration is an emerging global 
trend, but given the size of the problem it cannot be a general solution. 
A final solution is to expand the group of contributors to the pension system 
by the employment of people currently unemployed (including the NEETS, 
people not in employment, education or training, and the furiita who choose to do 
only occasional casual work). In Japan, there is a growing proportion (after the 
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bubble bust) of NEETS, temporary workers, and poor workers without the chance 
of societal mobility. Young people know that they must be flexible and extremely 
hard working to get good job opportunities, and overtime is seen by them as a 
practically mandatory part of their life, which is why many prefer the furiita  
option. The problem is that those who are affected by unemployment for a long 
time are not likely to be in demand from companies as permanent workers. The 
long recession in Japan means that companies have cut costs by hiring more 
workers on a temporary basis. The result is that there is a growing proportion in 
the post-bubble period of NEETS, temporary workers, and poor workers without 
the chance of societal mobility. Even the traditional urban casual workers are 
being largely replaced by foreign labor (Gill 2001). A large number of hard-to-
employ job seekers will remain. In some industries it is likely that many open 
positions can be filled only if higher wages are paid. 
So how willing is Japan to raise its net immigration rate to raise the size of 
the population? There is a limit to which existing unemployed persons can be 
reeducated for other jobs (mailmen cannot to changed into heart surgeons). 
Outsourcing of production sites in manufacturing is already well advanced, and 
many of the jobs remaining in Japan are skill-intensive, which requires local 
training. As the working age population declines and as skilled and experienced 
workers retire, the viability and prosperity of Japan’s future is endangered, despite 
the mass provision of tertiary education. The shortage has so far only affected 
individual professional groups, and the national labor market at large is not yet 
impaired. In particular, Japanese SMEs (small and medium size enterprises) face 
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serious problems and do not have the potential of large corporations to use 
international staff to remove these bottlenecks.
1.6 Competition from other regions
Increasingly international immigration draws on a global labor market, and 
Japan is involved in increasing (economic) competition from neighboring regions. 
Its competitive advantage is declining in conventional manufactures, which means 
that in future, it will have to focus on high quality and sophisticated products. If 
the population is aging and reproductively unwilling, Japan has to worry about its 
competitiveness if it is unable to bring the best and the brightest into the country 
in future. So, despite its dire need for foreign labor, Japan is losing in the 
competition with other countries in terms of accessibility and attractiveness5. It is 
now low ranking, behind most European countries, the USA, Australia and even 
Korea (in regard to accessibility) (Global Migration Barometer 2008: 9-12).
1.7 Japan as a model for other countries with similar aging problems
The reason why Japan is interesting from a research and policy point of 
view is simply that it is the first economically advanced nation to suffer from a 
super-aged, shrinking population, and therefore one that has to choose from a 
variety of options how to handle this peculiar development. Independent of the 
prospect of failure or success, any data generated from Japan's experience can aid 
other countries in finding their own solution when they reach that inevitable 
5  Overall ranking: 28th; Attractiveness to Migrants: 22nd; Accessibility for Migrants: 53rd; Need 
for Migrants: 1st.
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crossroad.
1.8 Research questions and the remainder of the thesis
Given these variables, the remainder of the thesis will concentrate on the 
following research questions. 
• What has been the impact of population decline on Japanese society? 
• What have been the main patterns of migration to and from Japan 
historically, and what are the most important contemporary flows in and 
out of Japan? 
• What ethnic and national minorities are now resident in Japan, what are 
their main social characteristics, and in what kinds of niches in the labor 
market are they primarily employed?
• What has been the government response to population change, both at the 
national and local level? In particular, what attitudes to migration have 
developed at the grass roots level, in local administrations, and what 
initiatives have they put in place to support the integration of the migrants?
Chapter 2 discusses population decline in Japan, particularly with reference 
to the rural areas. It also discusses the impact of population decline on the rural 
family, and in particular relations between the generations, and between foreign 
wives and their husbands’ families. Finally this chapter discusses the implications 
of these findings for the labor market and patterns of immigration. 
Chapter 3 looks at the historical roots of migration to and from Japan, which 
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goes back longer than is often supposed. It considers the main patterns of 
migration from the end of the Edo period, and the impact of Japanese imperialism 
on flows of migrants, mainly from China and Korea. The chapter then turns to a 
discussion of the postwar flows of migration, as Japan’s economy moved into a 
long period of high-speed growth, followed by the end of the bubble economy, 
and the long period of recession starting in the early 1990s. The main minorities 
present in Japan are then discussed in detail, in particular Koreans, Chinese, 
Filipinos, and Nikkeijin as well as smaller groups including  Thai, Nepalese, 
Pakistanis, Iranians and others.  
Chapter 4 describes the response of Japanese government and society to 
population change, and the changing policies towards immigration and the 
integration of the newly arriving migrants. It discusses local government 
initiatives, together with less formal mechanisms of integration organized by 
NGOs or by groups of migrants themselves. 
The final chapter summarizes the arguments, and considers the most likely 
scenarios for the development of the Japanese population, the labor market, and 
immigration in the future.
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Chapter 2. The impact of population decline
2.0 Introduction
In the first and second sections, Chapter 2 discusses the current and future 
population decline in Japan and its consequences with a particular focus on rural 
areas. The available data show that economically weaker regions are already 
facing the outmigration of younger people, with even the most prosperous regions 
and their younger working age populations facing decline by 2025, ultimately 
decreasing the number of (financial) providers of services and social security. 
Particularly hard hit are likely to be the education institutions in rural areas with 
schools closing down, further reducing the competitive advantages of these 
regions. As an example, Tohoku’s Towa-cho tries to overcome these trends by 
subnational cooperation, tourist activities, going green, etc.
The third section discusses the subsequent effects on rural families that in 
some cases arise from inheritance traditions, which cause intergenerational 
tensions between family members still living in the rural areas, and their relatives 
who now live in the cities but are considering returning. The results of these 
disputes range from living in separate households on the same property to divorce.
The fourth section introduces already visible evidence of aging and 
depopulation in postwar Japan’s labor market, and how the domestic labor market 
circulation has been supplemented by international immigration.
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2.1 Population decline in Japan
A look at the subnational level reveals that today’s differences in rates of 
speed and severity of population decline continue to increase, widening the gap 
both between regions and prefectures (Nishioka 2011). In the future, this will 
result in damaging some prefectures, and leading to demographic collapse in 
others, even in the absence of future adverse events including natural disasters 
such as the recent Tohoku earthquake, which will lead to even more rapid 
population decline.
Generally speaking, the previously described evolution of the Japanese 
population living in what are, for the time being, economically stronger and 
wealthier urban areas and relatively weaker rural regions, has revealed its full 
effects since the onset of nationwide population decline in 2005. Nishioka’s 
figures (2011) show that Japan’s only remaining growth regions before the 
population reached its inevitable peak (Kanto, Chubu, Kinki), only Kanto, or 
more precisely Southern Kanto (2005: 34.48 million; 2010: 35.06 million; 2015: 
35.2 million) has withstood the general trend and has a growing citizenry, Chubu’s 
population has stagnated at around 17 million, and the other regions are falling 
below their previous levels at an accelerating rate. None of the losses in the 
country’s nine regions between 2030 and 2035 are forecast to be less than three 
percent; whilst today (2010-15) only Tohoku and Shikoku have reached that level. 
Another four regions are losing only up to two percent, as can be seen in Table 3. 
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Table 3. Projected Population Growth Rate by Regional Block
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 14).
On a prefectural level, this development becomes even more polarized (for 
prefectural figures, see Appendix 8, for prefectural growth rates, see Appendix 9).
Between 2005 and 2010, only seven prefectures could retain or expand their 
total populations, primarily Tokyo6 and Okinawa – both of which will continue to 
grow in future. On the other hand, the worst cases of shrinkage have occurred in 
Akita (-4.5%) (cf. Mock 2008), followed by Wakayama (-4.1%) (cf. Knight 2003) 
and Aomori (-3.5%), which will lose more than one fourth of their populations in 
the near future (2035: Akita: 31.7%; Wakayama 28.8, Aomori 26.9%); others will 
also depopulate fast. Besides Tokyo and Okinawa, by 2035, only other six 
prefectures will have rates of decline lower than that of the Japanese population as 
a whole, and they are located in the three main urban areas of Kanto, Chubu and 
Kansai (Nishioka et al., 2011). With that in mind, Japan’s urbanization will 
6 Tokyo will follow the general trend in 2020, first declining by 57.000 people to 13.05 million 
over a five year period (2035: 12.7 million), following its industrial brothers in the Kansai area, 
yet still larger than current levels.
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continue on an unbroken path. In the future, three in ten people (2010: 27.6%) 
will be living in Southern Kanto, already today Japan’s most populated region, 
and 35.8 percent in Kanto as a whole. Furthermore, whilst its second most 
populated region – Kinki – faces a minuscule decrease of 0.5 percentage points 
(2035: 15.9%) due to Osaka losing 1.5 million, Chubu can catch up. Overall, 
Japan’s dwindling population is projected to work, live, and procreate in further 
concentrated areas of the country.
The continued increase in childlessness, continuing the decline which began 
back in the late 1940s (see Figure 3), further exacerbates the shrinking of the 
general population. It can be found anywhere in Japan, on any subnational level, 
and there are no exceptions. In spite of temporary growth in some places, only a 
little more than one million children will populate the playgrounds and schools of 
Tokyo in 2035. But these children will make up only eight percent of the 
population, the lowest proportion of any prefecture. At the other end of the scale 
will be Okinawa, which will maintain the highest rate of children aged 14 or less 
throughout the projected period (2010: 17.4%, 2035: 13.3%). Whilst today the 
rate of the child population in every prefecture is still in the two digit range, just 
as at the national level, the majority (27) of prefectures will fall into the single 
digit range, aggravating the existing burden on the shoulders of current working 
age citizens and children already born, who are facing a growing elderly 
population (see Appendix 11).
Unsurprisingly, with minor exceptions, the working age population will 
continue its downward trend since it peaked around 1995 (see Appendices 5 and 
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6). Exceptions include Okinawa, where due to its comparatively higher fertility 
rate in the past, its present labor force will continue to increase until 2015 in 
absolute numbers. Tokyo, Aichi, Kyoto and Osaka will increase between 2020 and 
2025 in relative numbers. The implications for the labor force can be seen in the 
difference of 11.1 percentage points between the participation rates projected for 
2035 for Tokyo (61.4%) and Akita (50.3%) (see Appendix 12). 
The severity of the problem of aging in Japan can be seen in the increase in 
the old-age population (Nishioka et al. 2011, see Appendix 14). Its size will 
continue to increase in the course of the next decades in absolute and relative 
numbers. There are already today 13 million more pensioners than children living 
in Japan, and further along the road, this difference will increase to 27 million. If 
both are seen in combination, the dependency ratio will increase to unprecedented 
levels. 
In conclusion, you can say that the general age-structure will be turned 
upside down. Where once the number of children supported economic prosperity 
in later years as they turned into adults, the same cohort of once playful children 
has turned old and grumpy, burdening the succeeding generations, with no option 
of escape.
One consequence of this is that the number of people living beyond 100 will 
dramatically increase in future. In their paper, “Survival beyond Age 100: The 
Case of Japan,” Robine and Saito note that the number of centenarians has grown 
by a factor of 100 in just 38 years – from 154 in 1963 to 13,036 in 2000. In the 
1960s, the number of people over 100 doubled around every six years, which had 
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fallen to 4.8 years at the end of the 1990s (Robine and Saito 2003: 210). The 
greater part of the increase since 1973 in the number of persons 100 years old 
currently living in Japan (55 percent) was due to the increased probability of 
surviving, while the rest of the increase (45 percent) was due to the increase in the 
size of the birth cohorts (Robine and Saito 2003: 213). Their results suggest that 
the emergence of the centenarian population in Japan will continue to accelerate, 
with the time necessary for this population to double being reduced by half in just 
25 years.
2.2 Rural depopulation
The impact of the demographic trends of aging population and declining 
fertility is regionally very different: some prefectures, especially those near the 
large cities, are still growing in population, while many in the rural areas are 
already in rapid decline. At present, the effects of persistently lower numbers of 
children has already been visible for some time in rural areas where large families 
were once the norm (Matanle 2006). These regions have supplied growing 
metropolitan areas with migrants for some time, and outmigration, coupled with 
low rates of fertility, mean that the population is already in rapid decline, a trend 
that dates back in some prefectures to the early 1950s. In recent years there have 
been increasing examples of the merging of administrative bodies and the 
unification of cities, towns and villages, to decrease the related costs of public 
officers. The closing of schools, primarily elementary schools, is well advanced in 
some rural areas, and the children are sent to urban areas where they can attend 
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more prestigious schools, a stepping stone for their later careers. The urbanization 
of the education system results in a vicious circle, with children getting worse 
education than the rest if they stay in the rural areas, and middle class parents 
moving to the larger cities, as the rural environment does not provide the best 
educational infrastructure for the future of their children.
In John Mock’s study of Akita, the trends are particularly dramatic. He gives 
the example of Kita Akita City, an amalgamation of four small townships arranged 
so that they would qualify for better funding from the central government. The 
population was 42,050 in 2000, and is expected to fall to 30,040 by 2020 (Mock 
2008: 126). The decline in the population of rural townships began in the middle 
of the 20th century, with an increase in the upper age cohorts, and the population 
over 65 has been increasing. Mock argues that only systematic long term social 
and economic restructuring can position Japan to cope with the post-maximum 
population era. 
As the population falls, there are severe implications for the education 
system. Since local districts cannot effectively raise funds, either the prefecture or 
the national government will have to be the sources for basic funding of 
education, against the background of rapid population decline. As for the school 
curriculum, it follows national standards set by MEXT, but there are differences 
between townships and major urban areas, and in the peripheral cities, there are 
fewer juku, to provide the additional training necessary to get into the higher 
ranked universities. Most secondary schools are located in densely inhabited areas 
of the prefecture, and tertiary institutions are located mainly in Akita and 
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Yurihonjo City. The implication is that children from rapidly depopulating areas 
will be at a disadvantage in competing for the best universities. In addition, as in 
other rural areas of Japan, there are many marriages between Japanese men and 
women from other countries such as the Philippines (Faier 2009), but 
multicultural education is not given priority, either in the formal or informal 
educational sectors. There has been little impact in terms of making Japan more 
multicultural. The expectation so far is that minorities will assimilate. Chinese and 
Filipinas will take Japanese names and blend into the Japanese cultural scene. 
John Knight’s study of rural Wakayama shows some of the environmental 
problems of the aging society (Knight 2003). He cites examples of efforts to resist 
rural depopulation in upland Japan, though the populations of many uplands areas 
are still declining (2003: 107). In Wakayama, forest was the dominant local 
industry. Fairly typically, the population of the community he studied had fallen 
from 10,276 in 1955 to 4,310 in 1995, due to the outmigration of younger family 
members rather than the departure of whole families. The low fertility rates 
therefore result from the removal of the more fertile younger age groups through 
outmigration. In 1970, local deaths exceeded local births for the first time. In 
1960, children aged between 0 and 14 made up 37 percent of the population but 
by 1996 this had diminished to 12 percent. In 1955 people, aged over 65 made up 
6.7 percent of the local population, but by 1995 this proportion had increased to 
33 percent. In 1994, 31 percent of men in their 30s were unmarried, compared 
with a national figure of around 25 percent. These problems tend to affect white 
collar workers much less than agricultural workers. Even though family ties bind 
33
migrants to their natal localities, the population still continues to drop (Knight 
2003: 108-109).
Things are made worse by the demoralization of the residents in 
depopulating areas (Knight 2003: 110). There has been a large drop in the area of 
rice cultivation, much of which has been transformed into dry fields for the 
cultivation of vegetables. As a result, the forest has expanded in upland areas. The 
countryside is seen by many as a depressing place, due to the number of empty 
houses, closed schools, abandoned farms, and the spread of the forest with its wild 
animals. There are high rates of family breakdown and depression, with high rates 
of suicide among unmarried men. The incursion of wild animals, such as bears, 
boars, deer and monkeys into the village space is accelerating the process (Knight 
2006). The damage that they do to houses and farms, and the dangers which they 
pose helps speed up the migration of the local population to the cities.
The local administrations are trying to reverse this with programs of akarui  
machizukuri (Creating the Bright Town), in order to promote positive thinking 
about the town’s future. There are infrastructural projects, construction of 
facilities, and attempts to attract investment from the private sector, including the 
location of industry. The hope is that the availability of jobs might attract migrants 
looking for employment. There are also efforts to stimulate the birthrate, through 
setting up marriage brokerage services, establishing clubs in which local men and 
women can meet, and even creating formal relations with foreign countries to 
recruit potential brides. There are also schemes to promote having children, as 
well as encouraging people who have left the town to consider returning, through 
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nostalgic furusato images and cash incentives. There are also initiatives to provide 
housing for migrants wishing to come back. To publicize the district, a rural-based 
mail order operation has been established to sell local produce to the urban areas. 
There have been a small number of new settlers since the 1980s: Knight found 
that some people living in the cities had been attracted back to try their hand at 
organic farming or to work in forestry (for these initiatives see Knight 2003: 112-
118).
One further strategy is to attract the elderly (Knight 2003: 119-120). Given 
that some towns with high rates of aging and large populations over 65 have good 
services, it would seem rational to concentrate large numbers of old people in one 
place. Some rural municipalities have established “Silver Areas” and “Welfare 
Villages” as special zones to meet this need. He argues that in future, 
municipalities may could compete with each other to attract the elderly, and to 
attract additional funding for these services. Even though these schemes in effect 
define the elderly as a resource which can be exploited, they have also been 
criticized, on the grounds that areas which already have a large proportion of 
elderly people are being used to dump the elderly from other areas. The argument 
is that a balanced population is needed in order to prevent the outmigration of the 
remaining local youth. 
However, a more demographically balanced rural society really depends on 
the establishment of a viable economic base. Whether organic farming or forestry 
can supply this is doubtful: the problem is that most young people are already 
used to living in the city: as Knight notes, in a sociological sense, rural Japan has 
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ceased to exist, as most people’s experience is now of urban life (Knight 2003: 
121).
Thompson’s study of Towa-cho in Tohoku suggests similar problems and 
strategies (Thompson 2003). As in other parts of Tohoku, the main direction of 
migration is from rural to urban Japan (ibid: 93-94). The municipality is striving 
to retain its vibrancy, and local bureaucrats are also fighting for the survival of 
their jobs and budgets (ibid: 95-96). The key is to generate new patterns of income 
and consumption. Restrictions on agriculture have led to a situation in which 
farming has become a part-time job, and living only on the income from 
agriculture becomes difficult. Generally, levels of employment in occupations 
outside agriculture have increased. 
The government recognized the problem and gave grants to communities of 
¥100 million to promote their “home town” image, and to develop new kinds of 
crops which could find a wider market. In line with this, Towa-cho attempted to 
improve its image nationally by getting together with three other towns with the 
same name to form a “Four Towa Alliance” and market the towns’ products 
throughout Japan (ibid: 100-103). After the Kobe earthquake of 1995, Towa-cho 
also gained publicity by offering empty houses to help earthquake victims relocate 
to Iwate prefecture. There were also attempts to develop a hot spring resort by 
drilling for hot water. However, these projects came to nothing and did not 
increase employment or reverse the population decline. The mayor, who was the 
main force behind these developments, resigned in an argument over rice 
production. 
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Another problem resulting from depopulation is the fall in the government 
funding which comes to the village for each additional resident (Thompson 2003: 
95-96). Local communities and politicians spend much time and effort traveling to 
Tokyo to lobby the central bureaucracy. Given the fall in the population, they have 
become increasingly dependent on additional sources of funding for their 
operating budget since the 1980s. Like other rural communities, the town is 
making efforts to stop young people from leaving, and to attract new residents, 
mainly through generating jobs in the service sector. It is making efforts to project 
the image of the town as a community full of possibilities, and the media coverage 
helps to heighten the town’s profile, which makes funding easier to raise in Tokyo. 
Solving the town’s problems therefore depends on the ability of its bureaucrats to 
utilize the Japanese system and devise creative solutions to the problems the 
communities face, through what Thompson terms “population politics” (2003: 
97).
2.3 The family and population decline
In addition to its effects on the local economy and politics, rural 
depopulation in Japan is having a profound impact on the family. This is also 
linked to the issue of the support of old people in old age, given that families are 
now small and scattered, and younger people are more likely to live in the city 
than in the rural areas.
In prewar Japan, the general principle was that the eldest son would inherit 
the parent’s property, together with the leadership of the household and its 
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economic activities. In return for this, he and his wife would have the primary 
responsibility of looking after his parents in old age. One major area of change is 
therefore the relationship between married women and their in-laws, discussed 
most dramatically by John Traphagan (2003). Historically, in the Japanese family, 
married women were expected to support their husbands’ parents rather than their 
own parents in old age, and to some extent this is still the case. But it is a role that 
potentially can lead to conflict, and many stress their independence by refusing to 
provide this support. Living with in-laws potentially means conflict, and a lack of 
independence. Some 90 percent of those providing care for the elderly are women, 
and with the increasing number of people living to a great age, and the declining 
number of their children, the probability of having to share this kind of 
responsibility is much higher than it was in the past (for details, see Traphagan 
2003: 204-210).
Whether or not a woman should live with her in-laws or parents is therefore 
a major issue. Traphagan cites a number of cases from his research in Mizusawa, a 
town in Tohoku with an aging population. In the first case, a woman’s mother-in-
law decided that she would buy land for her son to build a house, so that she could 
come and live with him and his wife, should she become ill in later life. The wife 
was horrified, and her husband eventually persuaded his mother to use the money 
to buy help if necessary, rather than move in with her son. Traphagan’s informant 
also said that if the mother-in-law did move in with her son, she would consider 
divorcing him (this case is drawn from Traphagan 2003: 212-213). 
The second case (ibid: 213-214) was that of a woman who was an eldest 
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daughter, who married a man who was an eldest son. She had married late, by 
which time, from her viewpoint, the only prospective husbands available were 
eldest sons7. However, she could not agree with the attitudes and values of his 
parents, and the conflict over which set of elderly relatives they would support 
finally led to divorce. 
A third informant (ibid: 214-217) lived together with her mother-in-law in 
separate houses on the same plot. She had married a third son, but his two elder 
brothers moved to Tokyo, leaving her husband to look after the parents. She said 
that if she had found out that he would have to do this, she would not have 
married him. After some years living in Yokohama, her husband decided that they 
would have to return to his home town to look after his parents, who were noisily 
demanding he should return. After they moved, her father-in-law died, and her 
husband was transferred by his company back to Yokohama – leaving his wife 
living with her mother-in-law. She had provided in-home care for her father-in-
law before he died, and also much of the hospital care such as taking him food 
and changing diapers. She told Traphagan she intended to move back to 
Yokohama herself when her children had grown up and moved out – but 
anticipated big problems if her mother-in-law was still alive. She mentioned two 
specific problems with mothers-in-law in rural areas: pressure for her to go out 
and work to bring in extra money, and conflict over how to bring up the children.
The fourth case (ibid: 217-220) was that of a couple who had moved back to 
7 “I married late, in my early thirties. The problem is that by that age, the only ones remaining 
are eldest sons and eldest daughters, because nobody wants to marry an eldest. They have a 
very difficult time getting married. This is unlike being a second son or second daughter.” 
(Traphagan 2003: 214)
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Mizusawa five years before, to help the husband’s mother take care of his 
grandmother. She got on relatively well with her husband’s mother and 
grandfather – but neither of them got on well with his father, who they saw as 
trying to control their lives. The wife said that she had taken a job, simply to get 
out of the house and get away from her father-in-law. The husband had problems 
with him as well – which had led to physical fights in the past.
Traphagan’s conclusion is that co-residence is often resisted, and the precise 
terms have to be negotiated. To many women, it “implies loss of autonomy, 
personal conflict, and emotional strain” (Traphagan 2003: 224). The values of the 
older and younger generations are often different, and parents often assume that 
their children and their spouses should look after them in return for the eventual 
inheritance of property. They have the attitude that they save money for their 
child’s college, and intend to give it their property, so it is natural that they should 
expect to be cared for by their children in the future. However, wives are often 
unwilling to provide care for their in-laws. There is often a power struggle over 
the raising of the children, and to some extent the grandmother has the upper hand 
because it is often her household and the son’s bride is considered essentially an 
outsider. In some cases, like the fourth of Traphagan’s informants (2003: 217-
220), they even dislike their in-laws intensely. Co-residence is therefore both 
contested and resisted – so that assumptions that the welfare of the elderly can be 
left to their children and their spouses in future would seem to be rather 
unrealistic.
As seen in these examples, it is often difficult for those living in the 
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peripheral areas of the country to find spouses at all, and this increasingly means 
that Japanese without partners look for them internationally, as described by Chris 
Burgess in his study of Yamagata (Burgess 2008). Most of the foreigners in 
Yamagata are permanent migrants, and many of them have married locally. 
Because of their location, they are more likely to make efforts to integrate with 
local society in the region, making it more multicultural in the process, and 
challenging stereotypes of who is “Japanese” and who is “foreign” (Burgess 2008: 
65). As is typical of peripheral areas, the population of Yamagata is aging faster 
than the national average, with the result that spouses are likely to be living with 
their in-laws and working in the local labor market. Yamagata took the lead in the 
1980s in bringing in brides from abroad, and one in fourteen marriages in 2000 
was international (ibid: 65-66). The area therefore has long and extensive 
experience in helping these foreign newcomers settle into their new surroundings, 
so that cultural change may be more rapid in these peripheral areas than 
elsewhere. Burgess argues that it is the local communities like Yamagata which 
are at the forefront of internationalization in Japan (2008: 76) as well as the debate 
as to whether to open up the country for foreigners. Two-thirds of the foreign 
residents in the area are Chinese and Korean, though in some other areas of the 
country there are also a number of brides from the Philippines (Faier 2009). 
Women are at the center of these changes. To make the most of these 
opportunities, the foreign women have to be proactive, appear to accept local 
customs and values, and make the most of the situation. They have to change their 
own lives, rather than wait for someone to do it for them, and they find that with 
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patience and understanding, acceptance is possible. Burgess argues that to 
construct a society that can accept foreigners requires a change in the way that 
identities are represented in Japan (2008: 76). Even though Japan is less 
homogeneous than it once was, the influx of transnational migrants can also help 
reinforce both local ethnic identities and national(istic) ideologies, a point which 
will also be apparent from the consideration of Latin American migrants in a later 
section.
2.4 Labor markets and immigration
Given the problems of the falling population and the labor shortage in some 
sectors of the market, it is not surprising that many people see the necessity of an 
increase of immigration into Japan in the future. Douglass and Roberts note that 
there is a popular view in Japan of migration as a temporary phenomenon, “which 
will be overcome through factory automation and off-shore relocation of 
corporate Japan’s labor-intensive industries” (Douglass and Roberts 2003: 3). In 
fact, an increasing numbers of foreign workers and their families will probably 
settle permanently in Japan, and despite the long economic recession, migrants are 
still finding niches in the domestic labor market. Despite negative stereotypes in 
the media, they are hard working and responsible, very similar in many cases to 
the rest of the Japanese. There are therefore many people willing to champion the 
rights of foreign workers to equal treatment, both at work and in the community. 
With the influx of migrants, Japan is becoming more multicultural: “Ethnic 
neighborhoods are appearing in cities, and urban as well as rural areas are seeing 
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an influx of foreign brides who bring along their own cultural heritage and 
lifestyles” (Douglas and Roberts 2003: 5).
The influx of foreigners since 1945 has gone through a number of phases. 
Even before WWII, there was a substantial influx of Chinese and Koreans into 
Japan (Yamawaki 2003). After WWII and the exodus of most of the Koreans and 
Chinese “oldcomer migrants” in Japan, some 34,000 Chinese (14,000 of them 
Taiwanese) and around 600,000 Koreans remained. After the end of the War, both 
the Chinese and the Koreans lost their rights as citizens, and the Alien 
Registration Law (1952) deemed both Korean and Taiwanese residents aliens. 
This in turn meant exclusion from many social welfare benefits, and from public 
sector employment. They could naturalize – but this meant assimilating and losing 
their own identities. Meanwhile, the large numbers of soldiers and Japanese 
colonial settlers returning after the war meant that little additional immigration 
was needed until the late 1970s. In addition, 50 percent of Japan’s labor force was 
in the agricultural sector, and they provided much of the urban labor as the 
economy started to expand (for details, see Douglas and Roberts 2003: 5-6).
In the 1970s and 1980s, rural-urban migrants dried up as a pool of cheap 
labor, and more than 75 percent of the total population was now living in urban 
areas, while this proportion was about one third in 1950. The increasing shortage 
of labor and the rising value of the yen during the bubble economy of the 1980s 
meant an increasing number of foreign laborers in Japan, and immigrants became 
a new source of cheap labor. Emigration gave way to immigration. From the 
1970s, Asian women began to come to Japan in search of jobs as “entertainers” 
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(often in the sex industry), with over 50,000 arrivals a year in the 1990s. In the 
1980s, male migrants began to move into the lower paid jobs regarded as 3-D 
(dirty, dangerous, difficult) or its Japanese equivalent, 3-K (kitanai, kiken, kitsui, 
Douglas and Roberts 2003: 6-7) which were increasingly avoided by the Japanese. 
Problems of migrant control also increased. By the 1990s, there were an 
estimated 300,000 irregular migrants who had overstayed their visas, in addition 
to around 900,000 immigrants with work visas, mostly Nikkeijin, migrants of 
Japanese descent from Brazil and other countries in Latin America. There was an 
equal number of male and female migrants, though occupations and immigration 
status differed by gender. The dominance of sex workers among female migrants 
started to decline, and increasingly women came in as spouses for foreign male 
workers and Japanese men, who were employed in an increasingly wide variety of 
jobs (for details see Douglas and Roberts 2003, Weiner 2003, Fielding 2010). Key 
events included revision of immigration laws to allow in large numbers of 
Nikkeijin from Latin America (Tsuda 2003, 2008), while tightening up controls 
for other foreign workers looking for work. This mainly affected Bangladesh, Iran 
and Pakistan (Minami 2008), whose workers had been able to come in without 
visas in the 1980s. This happened at the same time as the end of the bubble 
economy, which led to a long recession and a falloff in the numbers of migrants 
coming to Japan, opening up for large-scale immigration of 200,000 Nikkeijin; 
but closing doors for many other foreigners seeking low-wage work. The history 
of migration to Japan and its current trends will be considered in the next section.
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2.5 Summary 
This chapter has discussed population decline in Japan, particularly with 
reference to the rural areas. It also discusses the impact of population decline on 
the rural family, and in particular relations between the generations, and between 
wives and their husbands’ families. Finally this chapter discusses the implications 
of these findings for the labor market and patterns of immigration.
As was seen in section 2.1, the population of many of the prefectures in 
Japan, particularly northern Tohoku, is already in steep decline, with the collapse 
of both services and communities. As seen in this chapter, education is particularly 
badly hit as the number of children in some areas falls. In fact, it is only the major 
urban centers, Kansai, Kanto and Aichi/Chubu, in addition to Okinawa, which are 
managing to hang onto their share of the population, but decline will also set in 
there eventually. Given that the future population of Japan can fit into the present 
urban housing capacity, it seems likely that the populations of the rural areas will 
continue to fall, as the low rate of fertility seems likely to continue. Meanwhile, 
the working age population will also decline, while the population of the aged – 
particularly the hyper-aged, will greatly increase.
The recent rural studies carried out in the rapidly ageing regions of the 
country show the impact of this at the micro-level. Knight’s work in Wakayama, 
in the Kansai area, but with similar problems to Tohoku, concentrates on the 
ecological effects of depopulation – with the decline of agriculture, the residents 
are demoralized, and the increasing encroachment of wild animals into former 
agricultural areas is increasing the outmigration. The main problem in 
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Thompson’s work on Towa-cho shows the financial problems of towns with 
declining populations, as the flow of subsidies from central government declines. 
As in Wakayama, the government has a number of colorful initiatives in place to 
reverse the trend – but as yet they have had little effect on the population decline. 
Finally, Traphagan’s work shows the impact of these kinds of pressures on the 
family, the increasing conflict between the generations, as the old people feel 
more neglected, and the younger people feel increasing unwilling to return to the 
rural areas to look after them. Finally, given that it is difficult to find wives for 
many farmers in the rural areas, the work of Burgess, as well as that of Faier 
discussed below (2009) shows one possible solution – the importation of brides 
from abroad, particularly from the Philippines. This relates to the subject of how 
far the population problem can be solved more rapidly by the alternative of 
immigration, and this is discussed in more detail in the next chapter.
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Chapter 3. Patterns of migration
3.0 Introduction
Chapter 3 looks at the historical roots of migration to and from Japan, in 
both historical and contemporary perspective. It describes the main patterns of 
migration from the end of the Edo period, and the impact of Japanese imperialism 
on flows of migrants, many of whom came from Japan’s occupied territories in 
Korea and China prior to the Second World War. The chapter then turns to a 
discussion of the postwar flows of migration, as Japan’s economy moved into a 
long period of high-speed growth, followed by the end of the bubble economy, 
and the long period of recession starting in the early 1990s. This is then followed 
by a detailed discussion of some of the main national and ethnic minorities in 
Japan, particularly the Koreans, the Chinese, the Filipinos, and the Nikkeijin from 
Latin America, mainly from Brazil. It also considers smaller groups such as Thai, 
Nepalese, Pakistanis, Iranians and others.
3.1 The Edo Period
Japan was fully involved in the trade and politics of the Asian region, until 
the Edo period. The Tokugawa shoguns were worried about the impact of the 
Portuguese and Spanish, together with Christianity and imports of arms, on the 
stability of Edo Japanese society, and closed up the country. Immigration, along 
with foreign trade, was tightly controlled, and the only place open to foreign trade 
from China and the Netherlands was Dejima, a small island which is now part of 
Nagasaki.
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Even though the inflow of information from the outside world continued, 
emigration from Japan was forbidden by capital punishment, in the policy of 
“national seclusion” (sakoku). Even within the country, mobility of goods and 
people was limited. There were checkpoints on the major roads, staffed by the 
agents of the regime. In the stratification system, traders had a low rank, below 
those of samurai and peasants, but during the Edo period, as trade boomed, they 
became increasingly rich, as the samurai lost both wealth and influence. But it 
was not until the collapse of the Tokugawa regime in the mid-19th century that the 
country opened up, and movement in and out resumed. The relevance of this 
history is that Japan historically has had long phases in which migration was 
welcome (e.g. Befu 2000), and also those in which the country was closed, and 
these images of globalization and closure (sakoku – e.g. Itoh 2000) are often 
found in contemporary discussions of migration and the position of migrants in 
Japan.
3.2 Migration from the Meiji period
As soon as the Meiji regime was established, emigration began, first to 
Hawaii and later to Latin America. The Meiji regime and its successors were 
worried about overpopulation, and emigration was encouraged. According to 
Shintani’s study of the Japanese migration to Peru (2005, 2006), the historical 
factors that influenced the initial Japanese immigration to Peru were the growth of 
the population, the need to provide impoverished farmers with work, if necessary 
abroad, the need for foreign currency supplied by remittances from overseas, the 
48
need to develop Japanese trade through exports, and overseas settlement as a tool 
to expand Japanese influence. The following is a summary of her arguments. 
Some 29,000 Japanese workers were sent abroad to work on sugar plantations up 
to 1984. The Meiji government decided to ban further emigration of Japanese 
workers for the sugar industry, and this led to the redirection of emigration to 
Latin American countries. The United States of America was not only seen as a 
labor market due to higher wages and better working conditions, but also as a 
place to receive additional education, thus North America became a preferred 
destination for Japanese emigrants before the imposition of immigration 
restrictions. Large-scale Japanese migration to Latin America began in 1899: 
Japan and Peru had already signed a Treaty of Peace, Friendship, Commerce, and 
Navigation in 1873, and in 1888, the Peruvian government allowed the 
immigration of Japanese labor to meet the demand for exports, especially 
sugarcane and cotton for the European Market. From 1899-1923, contract workers 
were imported, though the images of a South American paradise used by the 
emigration companies to promote migration soon vanished, as breaches of their 
obligations by the Peruvian landlords led the Japanese workers to strike, shortly 
after their arrival. Continued injustice and abuse forced many Japanese to run 
away from their employers. However, after 1924, sufficient numbers of Japanese 
were successful enough to invite their relatives and friends to work in Peru, 
mostly in urban areas. Previous Japanese immigrants served as guarantors, 
financing the trip for their friends and relatives. Brides were recruited for those 
already in Latin America through shashin kekkon (photo marriages) as family 
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members of migrants looked for prospective brides and introduced them via 
photos: the marriages took place by proxy in Japan before the brides left for Latin 
America. 
Japanese immigrants in Latin America were also aware of the importance of 
education for their younger relatives, and they began to establish schools to serve 
their communities there, starting in 1908. Lima Nikko was founded by the 
Japanese Central Society in 1920, and was recognized by the Japanese Ministry of 
Education. Before the First World War, about 22 Japanese schools were 
established, three of them recognized by Japanese Ministry of Education. Those 
that could afford it sent their children back to Japan for education, but otherwise it 
was provided in Peruvian centers. Within Peru, there was a secondary migration 
from the rural to the urban areas, and the Japanese established small businesses. 
These stimulated the establishment of Japanese associations and these, together 
with commercial groups, influenced the development of the Japanese community.
By 1930, 87 percent of the Japanese population in Peru was concentrated in 
Lima, and a number of other associations had developed, including the Nihonjin 
Kyokai (Japanese Association), Nihon Doshikai (Japanese Society), and Chou 
Nihonjinkai (Central Japanese Society). Associations were at the center of 
Japanese social life, and were one of the pillars of their ethnic community.
The concentration of Japanese in urban areas of Peru continued, and led to a 
backlash: in 1932, the '80% Law' was passed, stating that the workforce of foreign 
commercial establishments must have at least 80% of Peruvians workers. In 1936, 
naturalization procedures were cancelled to prevent Japanese obtaining citizenship 
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which would allow them to stay in the country. Peru was limiting immigrants in 
order to protect its own unemployed nationals. Despite protests by the Japanese, 
the restrictions were imposed without modifications. The political power of Japan 
at the time and the tight social boundaries of the ethnic minority increased 
suspicion and mistrust towards the Japanese, and in 1940 there were a series of 
assaults and arson attacks on them, the most traumatic event during the history of 
the Nikkei community in Peru. 
In summary, the Japanese migrants to Latin America encountered severe 
difficulties in both rural and urban areas. The appealing posters advertising 
emigration companies clearly differed from the reality, and most of the 
immigrants’ expectations were still not fulfilled after almost 40 years in Latin 
America. However, the second generation obtained better social and economic 
status than their parents. Meanwhile, the economic situation in Japan continued to 
force many farmers as to emigrate. National programs and propaganda promoted 
and supported the migration to Brazil. Later, the government had to apologize for 
misinforming people about the actual situation there. Japanese who did migrate to 
Brazil had a long period of struggle to be accepted into Latin American society. 
Later, the success of the Japanese in Peru meant that a Nikkeijin (Fujimori) 
became president of the country (Shintani 2006: 41). After the Meiji Restoration, 
Japan for a long time was mainly a country of emigration, with people settling all 
over the world, including the USA (Hawaii), Brazil and Peru.
Later, with increased economic prosperity, Japan became for a short time an 
immigrant destination, at first for conscripted workers, and later on, a destination 
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sought out by people that wanted to improve their personal economic prosperity.
3.3 The Japanese empire: Migration to and from Korea and China
In Japanese history, the growth of the foreign worker population since 1980s 
is not new. Already from the 1890s to the 1920s, foreign labor was a serious issue 
in Japan. As the Japanese empire expanded, the unskilled labor market was 
increasingly supplemented by Koreans and Chinese, while Westerners acted as 
international traders and professionals (oyatoi) in the public and private sector. 
They lived in the foreign settlements in Yokohama, Nagasaki, Hakodate, Kobe 
and Niigata and had extra-territorial rights, so that they were not controlled by the 
Japanese government. In 1894, the foreign treaties were revised, and after 1899, 
foreigners could settle anywhere in the country (for details, see Yamawaki 2003). 
Koreans had no extra-territorial rights, and were not restricted to these 
settlements. Before 1910, most Koreans in Japan were students, but after the 
annexation of Korea, increasingly they provided labor. Korean migration to and 
from Japan was officially controlled by the Government-General of Korea, and 
they provided much of the cheap, unskilled labor for the Japanese labor market 
(for details, see Weiner 1994). In the 1920s and 1930s the Chinese and Koreans 
were important in the expansion of Japan’s economic power throughout the 
region. Japanese companies were allowed to recruit large numbers of Korean 
workers, and from 1941 as the war intensified, they also brought in Chinese 
workers from Manchuria (Manchukuo), the site of Japan’s informal “total empire” 
(Young 1998). These Chinese workers were mostly conscripted to support the 
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military effort, and to provide cheap labor for the domestic agricultural industry. 
The migration was not one way. As the Japanese established their control over 
Manchuria, Japanese emigration to China was also encouraged (Young 1998). In 
what Young has called the “migration machine” (ibid: 352-98), the Japanese set 
up an extremely efficient propaganda organization to persuade Japanese of the 
delights of living in northern China, and the flow of migrants continued until the 
start of 1945, when the war was already largely lost. At the end of the war, the 
Russians invaded Northern China, the Japanese were swept out, and many of them 
died on the way back to Japan. From the empire as a whole, about six million 
Japanese including children returned to Japan, providing much of the labor which 
was absorbed during the 1950s as the economy started to grow again. 
As for Korea, according to Fukuoka’s account (2000: 3-20), the 1876 Treaty 
of Kanghwa established consular jurisdiction over Korea, and from the late 1890s, 
thousands of unrecorded Korean workers moved to blue collar jobs in coalmines 
and on the railway in Japan. In 1910, Japan formally annexed Korea, and from 
1910-1918, confiscated large areas of land for “Land Survey Enterprises.” From 
1920-34, the “Rice Production Increase Plan” boosted rice production, but exports 
of crops to Japan increased the level of rural impoverishment. As a result, many 
Koreans moved in search of jobs to Manchuria or Japan. Despite the massacres of 
Koreans in the wake of the 1923 Tokyo earthquake (Weiner 1994: 78-85), 
migration to Japan continued, and temporary migrants gradually settled and 
brought their families from Korea. Permanent residence became common in the 
late 1920s, and by 1938 there were 800,000 Koreans in Japan. The aim of the 
53
Japanese authorities was to assimilate the Koreans, forcing them to adopt 
Japanese versions of their names in 1940. 
During the Second World War, more Koreans were brought in as forced 
labor, including women to act as “comfort women” (sex slaves) for the Japanese 
military (Hicks 1997a). By 1945, the Korean population had risen to around 2.3 
million. Most returned to Korea after the Japanese surrender, but around 600,000 
stayed on, forming the nucleus of the present-day Korean community.
3.4 The Postwar Period
After WWII, 6 million refugees returned to Japan, and there was a brief 
baby boom before the population stabilized and the number of children began to 
fall. The supply of returned migrants and migration from the countryside to urban 
industries meant that Japan did not need to import much foreign labor until the 
late 1970s. Unlike the situation in much of Western Europe, even during the 
period of most rapid economic growth in the 1950s and 1960s, there was no mass 
importation of foreign workers to meet Japanese labor shortages, making Japan a 
“negative case” (Bartram 2000). This was a period that saw both the “income 
doubling program” of Prime Minister Ikeda (Tabb 1995: 92), the construction of 
the highway network, and the introduction of the high-speed shinkansen trains, 
first between Tokyo and Osaka, extending later on to include many of the other 
large cities in the country. As the country boomed, the population transition took 
place: the expectation of life rose rapidly, and the birthrate fell dramatically, with 
the spread of contraception and the legalization of abortion after 1948 (Coleman 
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1992). 
The high-speed growth lasted until the 1970s, and a series of “shocks” 
which affected the economy (Tabb 1995: 183). These included the floating of the 
American dollar by President Nixon, which led to the rise in the value of the yen 
against the dollar, which since 1949 had been fixed at ¥360 to the dollar, and the 
increase in the oil price, following the Middle East War of 1973. The result was 
that economic growth stopped, and then started again, but at a slower rate than 
before. However, the effects of the demographic transition in the 1950s and the 
fall in the birthrate were now apparent, and there was an increasing shortage of 
labor. The rising value of the yen also made Japan more attractive as a destination 
for workers, and the numbers of foreigners in the country started to rise. 
The 1980s saw the “bubble economy” (Wood 1993) which really took off after the 
Plaza Accord, an agreement on currently levels between the major industrial 
countries, in 1985. This allowed the value of the yen to soar against other 
currencies. The Japanese were now wealthy, and started to buy up companies and 
real estate around the world, arousing increasing hostility, particularly in the 
United States, leading to increasing confrontation (Tabb 1995: chapter 9). 
By this time, rates of education among the Japanese population had risen, 
making 3-D/3-K jobs increasingly unattractive, and raising the need for unskilled 
labor. The government did relax its immigration policies, but only for skilled 
labor. There were calls from industry to improve the skills of the unemployed, 
raise the retirement age, and allow more immigrants to come in. These calls came 
particularly from smaller companies where the majority of Japanese still worked 
55
and where the shortage of labor was most acute. But as other countries 
complained about the size of the Japanese trade surplus, some of the largest 
companies also began to offshore production, and establish manufacturing plants 
overseas. Meanwhile, the foreign population in Japan began to diversify, as Japan 
was fast becoming a multicultural society. By the late 1980s, there were already 
between 100-300,000 undocumented foreign laborers in Japan (Tabb 1995: 306-
7).
3.5 Present day minorities in Japan 
One of the best summaries of the current distribution of minorities 
throughout Japan is that of Tony Fielding in his paper, “The occupational and 
geographical locations of transnational immigrant minorities in Japan” (2010). 
The following section follows his analysis. In this, he argues that one of the most 
striking population-related developments in postwar Japan was the reversal of its 
transnational migration flow, as a number of foreign groups rushed in to benefit 
from the country’s growing economic prosperity and to contribute to the labor 
force. Although Japanese had emigrated in large numbers during the Meiji period, 
particularly to Latin America, to reduce the pressure of population to settle in 
Japan’s new colonies, the foreign population in Japan had remained relatively 
small, apart from the Koreans and Chinese. After 1945 and the start of high speed 
growth, despite the government’s official policy of only allowing skilled labor to 
come into the country, Fielding argues that the foreign population which resulted 
was mostly blue-collared. There were gender differences: while many of the 
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migrants from Korea, China and Latin America were male, the Thai and Filipino 
migrations were largely of women. From the late 1970s until the mid-1980s, the 
influx was mostly female, but since the late 1980s and the bubble economy, it has 
been predominantly male. A new stream of migration was the “return migration” 
of ethnic Japanese from Peru and Brazil and their numbers increased steadily after 
they were given preference in new legislation in the late 1980s, on the assumption 
that they would be culturally similar to the local population. However, they did 
have a distinct Latin American cultural identity, and this has been retained. The 
foreign population of Japan therefore ranges from the Koreans with the greatest 
similarity (given that many were born in Japan and had never been abroad) to the 
Nikkeijin. But even for foreigners who speak fluent Japanese, their foreign 
nationality bars them from entering public or security related occupations. 
Generally, with the decline of the rural population, international migration is now 
taking the place of the rural-urban migration of the 1950s and 1960s in supplying 
the urban labor market. The main exception is the movement of Asian women, 
mainly from the Philippines, to marry men in rural areas in which there are few 
Japanese women. Generally, the Tokyo region has expanded in economic 
importance at the expense of Kansai. The areas into which manufacturing 
expanded in the 1960s and 1970s, especially between Tokyo and Nagoya, are the 
regions in which the highest concentrations of new migrants are to be found. The 
sex ratio of migrants reflects their occupations, with men in manufacturing and 
women in services, including entertainment. Generally, employment regulations 
prevent foreign migrants from employment in public and security-related sectors. 
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The broad distribution of specific groups is as follows.
Koreans
Until recently, the Koreans were the largest ethnic minority in Japan, though 
they have now been overtaken by the Chinese (see Appendix 21). Even today, 
many are the descendants of old-comers who were in Japan before 1945. Given 
that many were born in Japan, speak only Japanese, and were educated in 
Japanese schools, their occupational profile is similar to that of the host society. In 
terms of region, they are largely concentrated in Kansai, though they are also 
found throughout the rest of the country. 
In Fukuoka’s account (2000), the Koreans who returned to Korea after 
1945 were generally the forced laborers of the wartime period. Those who stayed 
had been in Japan with their families for some time. In addition, new unregistered 
migrants came in and settled in the Korean districts of the major cities in the 
postwar period. Technically Koreans remained Japanese until the Peace Treaty of 
San Francisco in 1952, but in fact they had been deprived of the right to vote in 
1945, and made subject to Alien Registration in 1947. Various options were 
available to the Japanese, including respecting the human rights of the migrants, 
assimilation, and expulsion. Instead they opted for subjugation, allowing the 
Koreans to stay, but making life difficult for them and denying them citizenship, 
leaving them in a permanent inferior social status, a situation described by Hicks 
as “hidden apartheid” (Hicks 1997b). There were gradual reforms: with the 
normalization of relations with the Republic of Korea (South Korea) in 1965, the 
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Koreans in Japan were granted “treaty-based permanent residence.” All residents 
from former Japanese colonies were given the status of “special permanent 
residents” in 1991, and the hated fingerprinting of zainichi Koreans for identity 
cards was abolished in 1992 (after some cities refused to enforce it, see Pak 2003: 
263), but Koreans were still debarred from jobs in public administration. 
At the time of the Korean War, the Korean community divided into two, 
affiliated to North and South Korea respectively. The North Koreans set up their 
own education system in Korean, so they have generally retained their identity 
and language to a greater extent than the South Koreans (Ryang 1997), but with 
the current difficulties of North Korea, they are also tending to assimilate and 
adopt either Japanese or South Korean citizenship. Many Koreans have 
assimilated and taken Japanese citizenship, and the discrimination which they 
used to encounter in Japan has been greatly reduced in the last 20 years, even 
though it is still there, e.g. in relation to employment or marriage. There are also 
newcomer Koreans, many of them professionals with high levels of education. 
Generally, with their long history of settlement, the Koreans are the most similar 
to the Japanese in terms of their demographic profiles, with similar problems of a 
falling birthrate and an aging population.
Chinese
Some of the Chinese are descended from old comers in Japan since before 
1945 (Yamawaki 2003), both from Taiwan and the Mainland, though with the 
economic growth of China since the 1980s, there are an increasing number of 
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newcomer Chinese working and living in Japan, predominantly from the 
mainland. They are mainly working class, though there are also a growing number 
of middle-class professionals. Generally they are clustered around the Tokyo 
region. 
The most recent study of the influx of highly educated professional 
Chinese is that of Liu-Farrer. In her paper, “Between Privilege and Prejudice: 
Chinese Immigration in Corporate Japan’s Transnational Economy” (2010), she 
discusses the emergence of a growing occupational niche for Chinese immigrants 
in Japanese corporations, due to their high levels of education and bilingualism, 
which are important as trade and economic relations between the two countries 
expand. These skills give the Chinese a high degree of job mobility, and open up 
the labor market, even if there are still limits to their movement. With 
globalization, the Chinese often find themselves in strategically important roles 
within companies, which value them for their bilingual proficiency and hire them 
as “Specialists in Humanities/International Services” or “Engineers” for 
immigration purposes. Many of them have come to Japan to study, and have 
stayed on to find jobs after graduation, given that salaries in Japan are still higher 
than those in China, and that relations with China are increasingly important for 
Japanese companies. Generally, international education is seen as a means of 
recruiting skilled workers throughout the region. 
Companies find that with Chinese-speaking staff in the office, they are 
able to start business with China and they sometimes expand their businesses into 
China as a result. Some are recruited directly from China, while others are 
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recruited from Japanese universities, where two thirds of the foreign university 
students are Chinese. The jobs they prefer are in the corporate sector, where they 
are able to use the cultural skills they acquired in school.
Many of them work in information technology, as software engineers, and 
from the mid-1990s, the Japanese government encouraged the importation of 
these kinds of workers. Often they provide a bridge between the two countries, 
designing programs with Japanese clients, and then working with Chinese teams 
to implement the project. 
Whereas Japanese corporate personnel often remain with the same firm 
until retirement, the Chinese tend to move more rapidly, often to different firms, 
depending on their calculation of opportunities and returns. Their progress is thus 
often horizontal rather than vertical within the same firm. However, they are 
increasingly starting to gain permanent residence in Japan, or even Japanese 
citizenship, and these workers are more likely to take on leadership roles in 
Japanese corporations. Eventually some of them may decide to cash in on their 
experience and skills gained in Japan, and move into senior positions in 
corporations in China, or become transnational entrepreneurs. 
Women have less opportunity, experiencing the double barrier of being 
both female and foreign, though high tech businesses are often more progressive 
in relation to gender and promotion, and in some areas such as marketing women 
are particularly valuable (Liu-Farrer 2010: 140-42).
Thus relative to the past, the Chinese in Japan have a widening range of 
opportunities because of their cultural and language skills within the transnational 
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economy, even though these opportunities are still more limited than for their 
Japanese counterparts in the same jobs. Japanese companies have also been 
recruiting skilled personnel from other parts of Asia since the 1990s.
Filipinos
The majority of Filipino migrants are involved in production and personal 
services. They are highly concentrated in the capital region and also in the 
prefectures between Tokyo and Kansai, with men involved in construction, 
automotive and semi-conductor industries. The women are predominantly in the 
service sector, particularly in entertainment. Chitose (2006) notes that in recent 
years the migrants from the Philippines are the most feminized group of migrants 
in Japan, with 20 percent men and 80 percent women.
Cortez (2010) addresses the movement of migrants from the Philippines to 
Japan, and the push and pull factors which make them move, and his argument 
can be summarized as follows. First of all there is the gap between the economic 
levels of the two countries. Migration improves the standard of living of the 
migrants, and the Japanese generally avoid “3-D” jobs. Many of the jobs involved 
with family care, particularly of the elderly, could be seen as falling into this 
category. As noted above, the Japanese (particularly the women) are traditionally 
culturally obliged to take care of their elderly parents or parents-in-law, but 
demographic change including mobility, the shrinking of the family and the rising 
expectation of life mean that hiring health workers is becoming more and more 
necessary. This results in the further attraction of Filipino labor migrants to do the 
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job. While male Filipino migrants tend to be workers in companies under Japan’s 
training system, especially in the automotive and semi-conductor industries, 
female migrants in the post-war period increasingly moved into Japan’s 
entertainment industry. In 1960 there were only around 5,000 coming annually in 
as entertainers. In 1980 the number of female migrants overtook that of the males, 
and the annual total increased to 129,000 in 1998. In 2006, the Japanese 
government cracked down on the entertainment migrants, and now requires them 
to have artistic certification from their home country.
Many of those employed as domestic labor in Japan were either hired in 
directly, or came in as tourists. Relatives in Japan were also helpful in finding 
them jobs. These workers are generally better educated than the entertainers, with 
a higher percentage of women with college education. Remittances from Japan are 
25 percent of the total remittances from the whole of Asia, and are therefore vital 
for the Philippine economy. As the demographic transition in Japan continues and 
life expectancy increases, so demand for this type of labor seems likely to increase 
as well. This need could be met by using older people in the labor force, or by 
changing patterns of youth employment, but the engagement of foreign workers is 
the quickest way to deal with this growing problem. Japanese family obligations 
are increasingly seen as being met not by caring for the elderly using family 
members, but by hiring in additional labor from outside. Filipina nurses are in 
demand throughout the world because of the high level of training and their 
ability to speak English. Institutions giving training in care and nursing have 
mushroomed all over the Philippines, and the local industry cannot absorb all the 
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graduates. In the case of Japan, the Japanese government has negotiated an 
agreement with the Philippines to accept 400 nurses and 600 caregivers from 
2007, with the requirement that they have to pass Japanese qualification 
examinations in Japanese within three or four years in order to stay in the country 
permanently. So far, however, very few have been able to pass the exams, so 
whether this gesture by the Japanese to open up their labor market is more than 
symbolic is open to question. In future, all prospective migrants could be asked to 
take Japanese language instruction before leaving the Philippines, which would 
allow them to fulfill the other requirements more easily. Another requirement for 
the system to work easily would be mutual recognition of nursing qualifications 
between the Philippines and Japan. However, two final problems remain: the 
preference of the elderly in Japan for Japanese carers, and the extent to which 
large-scale recruitment of carers from the Philippines will eventually cause a 
shortage of labor within the Philippines itself. 
In her study of women migrants from the Philippines, Dizon (2006) also 
notes that the gap between the rich and the poor countries pushes Filipinos to seek 
better economic alternatives abroad. Earnings in Japan are about seven times as 
much as in the Philippines, and the discrepancy between Japan and the Philippines 
is one of the important factors that causes migration. Until the early 2000s, most 
of the entertainers coming into Japan were women from the Philippines. They 
were able to come in because they were classified as skilled workers, even though 
the majority worked as hostesses in bars throughout Japan. Dizon discusses the 
qualifications of these entertainers, and the ways in which the system was 
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subverted. The 1981 certification issued by the Philippine government replaced an 
earlier requirement of “two year’s experience as a professional entertainer”. 
Formally, “overseas performing artists” (OPAs) underwent training, testing and 
certification from accredited institutions, and received advice on their rights and 
the protection available to them working overseas. However, the system became a 
source of graft and corruption, and the training agencies made a practice of 
receiving “commissions” for accrediting women who wanted to migrate. They 
were also in collusion with travel agencies and club owners and managers in 
Japan. On arrival in Japan, many women found that they were working for 
abusive employers, and had to surrender their passports while paying off fees 
owed to the agents and employers. The reality for most entertainers was very 
different from the written rules and regulations devised by the Japanese and 
Philippine governments, and failed to protect them from abuse. Some employers 
forced them to go on dates or have sex with their clients. Finding a Japanese 
husband is the best long-term option for many entertainers, as marriage ensures 
their long-term residency status together with other rights and benefits accorded to 
foreign residents in Japan. By 2004, the Japanese government was coming under 
international criticism for allowing what was seen as human trafficking related to 
the sex industry to continue. At the same time, an increase in crime and the 
increasing number of illegal migrants also pushed the government in the direction 
of action. Requirements for entertainers’ qualifications were tightened up, and the 
number of women entertainers coming into Japan fell drastically. However, the 
moves were not popular among women in the Philippines who wanted to come to 
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Japan, and the result was a demonstration by angry women outside the Japanese 
embassy (Dizon 2006: 69).
The recent study of the Kiso Valley region of central Japan by Faier (2009) 
is the most detailed picture of the lives of women from the Philippines who have 
settled in the rural areas of the country. Few Japanese women are willing to come 
as brides to the countryside and live with their mothers-in-law, so in many rural 
areas, women from abroad are the only alternative. Although Kiso now seems 
something of a rural backwater, it was not always so: in the Edo period, it was 
culturally ahead of Tokyo as travelers from Kyoto to Tokyo brought the latest 
fashions there first. More recently it has seen different kind of cosmopolitanism, 
with a number of marriages between Filipina women and Japanese men. Even 
though by Japanese standards it is off the beaten track, it is still part of a modern 
prosperous largely middle-class country, and life there is much easier than in the 
Philippines countryside. The men living there find it difficult to find brides, and so 
the marriages between Filipina women and Japanese men stemmed from 
desperation, rather than love. The women Faier interviewed saw lifestyles as a 
hierarchy, in which life in the Philippines was at the bottom, life in the urban areas 
of Japan was at the pinnacle, and life in rural Japan lay somewhere in between. 
Many women had not intended to move to rural Japan, but that is where they 
ended up (2009: 7). It had been badly affected by the long recession that began 
with the bursting of the bubble economy in the early 1990s, which hit Kiso more 
rapidly and harder than the cities. The numbers of foreign brides had increased in 
the areas not simply because young Japanese women were unwilling to marry 
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local men, but because some Japanese men preferred women from humbler 
backgrounds and less egoistic; one of her interview partners described them as: 
“They're like traditional Japanese women. They're patient” (Faier 2009: 128). 
Many of the women would have preferred to have gone to America, but became 
“stuck” in Japan on the way. Despite this, some had settled down and married, and 
were increasingly accepted by the local community. Despite stories of Filipina 
wives running away from Japanese husbands, many were still seen as ii  
oyomesan, good brides, who worked hard, took care of their in-laws, and had 
mastered the Japanese way of life. 
Latin American Nikkeijin (Brazilians, Peruvians)
The Latin American “returnees” are overwhelmingly involved in 
manufacturing industry as manual laborers, many of them in smaller companies 
supplying components to the auto and other export industries. They tend to be 
culturally distinct, and form their own communities, separate from those of the 
Japanese and other immigrants. Fielding regards them as the most segregated of 
Japan’s new minorities (2010: 112-13).
The most important studies of the Brazilians in Japan are those by Tsuda 
(2003, 2008), who looks at both the influx of the migrants into Japan, and how the 
Japanese have reacted to them. The reason why they come to Japan is obvious. 
Migrants classified as middle class in Brazil can earn from five to ten times as 
much as their Brazilian income in unskilled or semiskilled factory work in Japan. 
When they first started to arrive in Japan, it was assumed that their Japanese 
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heritage would make it easy for them to assimilate into Japanese society, but this 
generally has not happened, and the position of the Brazilians in Japanese society 
remains marginal. In Brazil, they see themselves as Japanese, but in Japan they 
are seen as Brazilians, different from native Japanese both in terms of language 
ability and in attitudes and behavior. They lack the company loyalty of their 
Japanese colleagues, and are labeled as gaijin, foreigners, because of their 
distinctive behavior. Interaction with Japanese outside work is generally rather 
limited to encounters in shops or offices. They are often classed as casual workers, 
move around, and do not form strong ties with their Japanese colleagues as a 
result. Because of this isolation, they create self-contained migrant communities, 
and interact largely within their ethnic social networks. City governments in areas 
with large numbers of Latin American migrants tend to be supportive, providing 
them with support and services, given that they are valuable members of the local 
economy, and are likely to stay in Japan. Meanwhile, the migrants continue to 
“perform” their national identities, through the use of distinctive clothes, 
language, rituals, and festivals (samba and carnival parades). Their presence also 
raises questions of what it means to be Japanese – at the outset the Brazilians 
identified themselves as Japanese, but were clearly not classified as such by their 
Japanese hosts. In other words, the presence of the Brazilians has in some ways 
heightened the sense of nationalism among the Japanese themselves, and their 
presence is seen by some politicians and commentators as a threat to Japan’s 
cultural homogeneity and social stability. Interestingly, however, Tsuda comments 
that some Japanese are more tolerant towards the Nikkeijin than the Koreans in 
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Japan: even though the Koreans were born in Japan and are culturally assimilated, 
the Nikkeijin are at least seen as Japanese in origin, even if not in behavior. Tsuda 
concludes rather gloomily that “if Japan is currently having trouble ethnically 
accepting and socially integrating its own Nikkeijin descendants, its ability to do 
so for other, more alien immigrants in the future is seriously in doubt” (2008: 
133).
In a recent conference paper, Higuchi [n.d.] looks at the effects of the recent 
economic recession on migrant labor in Japan and the Brazilians in particular. 
Because of the increasing flexibility of the labor market, there has been a lack of 
policies to integrate the Latin American Nikkeijin into Japanese society, and thus 
they are vulnerable to downturns in the economy. Despite the instability of their 
jobs, few of them had thought of collective action before the economic crisis, but 
preferred to move on to other jobs. Now, however, with less hope of finding other 
jobs, some have started to protest. Generally in Japanese firms, the last to be hired 
are also the first to be fired, and the ratio of jobs to applicants fell due to the 
recession from 0.83 to 0.42. Surveys showed that by late 2008 and early 2009, 
around 40 percent of Latin American workers were unemployed. Some decided to 
return home on as their unemployment insurance expired, and the number of 
returnees reached at peak in early 2009. Between September 2008 and June 2009, 
more than 50,000 Brazilians left the country, some 17 percent of the population. 
Higuchi estimated that the Brazilian population in Japan was likely to decrease by 
20 to 25 percent as a result of the recession. Many of them worked as “agency 
workers” – dispatched by agencies to work in large companies as the need arose. 
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Many large companies now use agencies to fill their temporary positions. These 
workers however are disposable. They often work in the auto and electronics 
industries, the sector of the market worst hit by the recession. However, the 
government has done little about the concentration of these migrants in temporary 
jobs. Employers take advantage of them because they have privileged visa status 
and can work freely in Japan, but they are both employable and disposable.
Whether the population of Latin American origin will increase or decrease 
in future is therefore an open question. On the one hand, they can gain permanent 
residence and stay in Japan freely, but on the other hand they are still concentrated 
in unstable jobs and therefore vulnerable to recession. In a paper published before 
the recession, Chitose (2006) drew attention to the demographic characteristics of 
the Brazilians, based on figures from 2004. Despite the stagnation of the Japanese 
population as a whole, the population of Brazilians grew 1.8 times between 1994 
and 2004, and 147 times between 1984 and 2004. By 2004, they accounted for 
14.5 percent of foreign nationals in Japan, compared with Koreans (31%) and 
Chinese (25%). Like other foreign populations, with the exception of the long-
settled Koreans, the Brazilians were a relatively young population on average. The 
most distinctive feature of their demographic profile were the number of men to 
women (122: 100), suggesting that the migration was still at an early stage, and 
the number of children. After a drop in the percentage of children on their first 
arrival in the 1980s, it began to rise again after 1992, reaching 18 percent in 2003, 
in contrast with the falling rates for the Japanese population as a whole. Brazilian 
children are also unevenly spread throughout the country, with high 
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concentrations in Gunma, Aichi and Shizuoka prefectures. The falling proportion 
of men to women and the large numbers of children both suggest that the 
Brazilian population was becoming stabilized in Japan, but this is counterbalanced 
by the evidence for an exodus, as the economic crisis grew in 2008-09.  
Other foreigners
Given the globalization of Japan, a number of other smaller ethnic groups 
have also entered the country, and are distributed largely on the basis of 
occupation (see Fielding 2010). The distribution of the Thai is similar to that of 
the Filipinos, with the men strongly represented in manual production work and 
many of the women in entertainment, in the “resort periphery”. Similarly other 
smaller groups of Southeast and South Asians are mainly involved in 
manufacturing industry, in the Tokyo region and in the industrial cities along with 
Tokaido line, between Tokyo, Nagoya and Osaka.
There are some recent studies of other Asian migrant groups in Japan, such 
as Keiko Yamanaka’s paper, “Transnational Community Activities of Nepali Visa-
Overstayers”, based on research in the Tokai region of central Japan (Yamanaka 
2008). Her informants put up with life as undocumented workers, doing 3-D jobs, 
but their wages are far higher than they could earn in Nepal. As undocumented 
workers, they encounter prejudice and discrimination from local residents, and 
exploitation at the hands of employers, while being harassed by the authorities. 
All the same, their labor is valuable because of the aging population and the jobs 
which still have to be done. As an industrial region, Tokai suffers from a chronic 
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labor shortage in small scale businesses, and there are a number of Nepali 
migrants, who are very diverse in terms of ethnic identity, caste, language and 
religion. Inflation and unemployment in Nepal during the 1980s and 1990s meant 
that many began to look for opportunities to work outside. The workers come in 
on tourist visas and stay on, and form a pool of cheap docile labor for local 
employers, though their daily earnings are comparable to monthly earnings of 
officials and professionals back home. Even though some workers in 
manufacturing industry are legal and some are not, it makes little difference to 
their wages. The idea most migrants have is to save money quickly and return 
home, but meanwhile they suffer from isolation and marginalization. Even though 
they are undocumented, they are still helped by some Japanese activists, 
volunteers, NGOs and unions in negotiations with employers or the Labor 
Standards Bureau. The low cost of their wages means that they can still find work, 
even though the penalties for the recruitment and hiring of illegal foreign workers 
are up to three years imprisonment or a maximum fine of two million yen. 
Nikkeijin migrants from Latin America, mainly Brazil and Peru have the legal 
right to stay in Japan, and so can command higher wages, but small-scale 
employers may not be able to afford to hire them, and prefer overstayers instead, 
despite the risks. In return, the migrants work hard, and are dedicated to their 
employers. The government is unwilling to crack down hard, because the jobs 
have to be done and the economy has been in a fragile state since the end of the 
bubble period. All the same, the crime wave associated with migrants by the 
media (including the crime of overstaying), and the increase in foreigners who 
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dress differently and speak different languages (even if they look similar) has 
caused public concern. Yamanaka makes the point that without the help of 
Japanese volunteers and NGOs, it would be difficult for these migrants to take 
action against abusive employers, or get medical aid and regular checkups 
(Yamanaka 2008: 191). 
Other Asian minorities include the Pakistanis discussed by Kudo (2008), 
many of them entrepreneurs in the second hand car trade and, interestingly, 
sometimes married to Japanese women. There is also a small literature on 
Iranians, mainly laborers, who came to Japan in the 1980s but left as the economy 
fell into recession in the early 1990s (Asgari et al. 2010).
3.6 Summary
It is clear from the foregoing descriptions that Japan now has a substantial 
number of foreign residents, both legal and undocumented, and that this has been 
increasing steadily in recent years. The “oldcomer” migrants from China and 
Korea, whose histories go back beyond World War II to the colonial period, have 
been joined by a substantial number of new groups, including the Filipinos (many 
of them women entertainers up to 2004), and Nikkeijin from Latin America, who 
are particularly numerous in the manufacturing industries between Tokyo and 
Nagoya. As Fielding’s work shows (2010), the distribution of these migrants in 
various parts of Japan and the occupations in which they are engaged varies 
considerably, but even in the rural areas there are substantial numbers of migrants, 
as shown in the work by Faier and Burgess. Indeed they argue that, paradoxically, 
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it is the rural areas which are in many ways at the forefront of the integration and 
assimilation of new groups of migrants in the Japanese population. In addition, the 
position is complicated by changing policies on the part of the Japanese 
government, for instance in the decision to cut down on the numbers of 
entertainers from the Philippines in 2004, as well as paying Nikkeijin unable to 
settle satisfactorily in Japan to return to their countries of origin in the face of the 
continued recession. It is also clear that many of the jobs for which the 
government will allow in legal migrants are not suitable for the skills of the 
migrants themselves, though this is changing, as Liu-Farrer’s study of 
professional Chinese immigrants shows. The next chapter focuses on both central 
and local government and the extent to which they are mounting initiatives to 
enable the migrants to live in and adapt to life in Japan.
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Chapter 4. Government response to population change
4.0 Introduction
Chapter 4 describes the response of Japanese government and society to 
population change, and the changing policies towards immigration and the 
integration of the newly arriving migrants. It discusses local government 
initiatives, following less formal mechanisms of integration, organized by NGOs 
or by groups of migrants themselves. It will be seen from the recent work of 
scholars such as Nagy and Pak that in fact many local authorities are extremely 
active in these initiatives, aimed at helping migrants over a wide range of 
problems encountered in their social lives. But in addition to these, the migrants 
themselves, along with NGOs of Japanese sympathizers, are also establishing 
institutions to help support migrants, particularly when they run into problems 
with employers, relatives, or the state. In contrast, the efforts of the national 
government are mainly at the policy level, having little impact on the lives of 
many migrants. 
4.1 Formal local government initiatives
With the declining population and tax revenue base, the Japanese 
government is forced to consider opening up the country to more immigrants, 
though their approach has so far been cautious, and many people are still 
somewhat opposed to the idea. The usual arguments include the one that, as long 
as there are still unemployed or underemployed Japanese, immigrants should not 
be allowed in on a larger scale. This ignores the problems of the 3-D jobs, 
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however, and the fact that illegal migrants will still enter the country and find 
work in small companies or through yakuza organizing casual labor for the 
construction industry, because there is so much work to be done. 
Japan is openly trying to encourage some categories of migrants, most 
notably students and tourists (Koizumi’s yokoso, or “Welcome to Japan” 
campaign). There is a difference in some sectors of the job market between 
foreigners who acquired their qualifications abroad and foreigners who went 
through Japan's education system. The latter usually have an advantage in finding 
jobs and dealing with administrative issues like the acquisition of a working visa, 
if only because they tend to be more fluent in Japanese. A number of international 
universities are now recruiting students to come to Japan, and one of their main 
selling points is their success in finding jobs for international students. A number 
of American universities set up campuses in the bubble economy period in Japan, 
but with the exception of Temple University, whose Tokyo campus is still 
flourishing, most of these have now been closed (Mock 2005). The government 
has now become involved with its Global 30 (G-30) program, even though with 
budget cuts it has now become G-13: the stated aim is to raise the number of 
foreign students studying in Japan from over 100,000 to 300,000 (for details, see 
the Japanese Ministry of Education website, http://www.jsps.go.jp/english/e-
kokusaika/index.html).
Recent research projects have looked at both central and local government 
initiatives to help the immigrants integrate into Japanese, society. In her paper, 
“Foreigners are local citizens too,” Pak (2003) gives details of the role that the 
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cities and regions play in immigration, together with the effects of activities taking 
place in the regions compared with the nation as a whole. Local governments and 
the region most affected by the migration are filling the gaps left by the state in 
relation to foreigners living in Japan. She also says that the local governments are 
changing their policies in order to treat foreigners like any other local citizens 
(gaikokujin to no gyosei shakai). She recognizes three forces that contribute to the 
efforts and local policies in incorporating foreigners. The first is the proximity of 
foreign migrants who are visible at the local level, and who are in need social 
benefits as residents in a specific region. Also the complaints about migrants by 
local citizens are generally directed at local government rather than national 
ministries. Second, as the local governments responded to demands for policy 
changes on social issues in the 1960s and 1970s, they became recognized as 
legitimate policy innovators. In the context of immigration, in view of the national 
government’s actions discriminating against against Koreans - even those born in 
Japan -, e.g. the former requirement of fingerprinting, migrants have cooperated 
with local government through local government consultative councils. Third, 
local governments have redefined the national government’s project and have 
devised an alternative agenda so that they can reach out to the foreign residents 
and give them support. 
Pak describes the differences between four different cities in response to 
international migration: Kawasaki, Hamamatsu, Kawaguchi, and Shinjuku (for 
details, see Pak 2003: 253-60). Historically, the cities followed the national 
government’s lead by ignoring the oldcomers’ needs and forcing the 
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implementation of measures like registration controls. Unlike the European case 
where migrants and locals are fighting over employment, in Japan most cities 
have concluded that they need migrants in the labor force, and they need to get 
involved in supporting them, in order to avoid the kinds of problems which have 
been experienced in Europe. 
Departments that are involved in providing services to non-citizens are 
aware of potential problems that can arise. But they are unwilling to look at 
problems outside their jurisdiction, because of the system of “vertical 
administration” in which departments tend to be independent form teach other. 
General appointments are less tightly linked to the chain of command and so 
officials in them can act more freely. Some cities have allowed new international 
officers to carve out new policies and new positions that work effectively. Local 
internationalization provides a framework for local initiatives – uchi naru 
kokusaika. Local officials are thought to be the appropriate implementers of 
internationalization, as grassroots agents, and thus able to avoid the negative 
connotations associated with the central government. When they are working out 
how to meet the challenge of an international population and implement changes, 
they are exercising local autonomy. However, though local practices and terms 
differ, usually the policies implemented are aimed only at documented migrants. 
Pak (2003: 250-51) reports a Kawasaki official says that, instead of fixing 
the problems one by one, as local government officials they had to think about 
how to solve all of them – so an international office was necessary to clear up all 
the problems at the same time. As for the differences and similarities of the 
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programs in the four cities she considers: many of them are targeted at 
overcoming the language barrier, by providing information materials in foreign 
languages, and teaching the migrants Japanese. The most progressive local 
governments define foreigners as local citizens who have the right to 
communicate with local government. Although the constitution only guarantees 
full political rights to Japanese citizens, the local government act specifies the 
protection and security of all local citizens, including non-Japanese. As a result, 
many local governments have abolished the nationality requirement for most local 
administrative positions. Kawasaki goes even further with a foreign advisory 
council, where the foreign population can confer with local bureaucrats and 
politicians. These efforts stem from past efforts by zainichi Koreans in the city to 
obtain civil rights and access to jobs.
Pak (2003: 255-59) outlines the main dimensions of differences between the 
four cities. The first is the extent of initiatives undertaken by the city, how 
accessible they are to foreign residents, and to what extent the needs of the foreign 
residents are taken into consideration. The second is the intensity of the efforts to 
shape community response, and whether the international office is developing an 
incorporation program which reaches across departments in the city government, 
and between local and other government agencies. In general, counseling services 
for foreign residents show the greatest variation, whereas the published material 
available for foreigners in each city in various languages is more or less the same. 
Some cities have a 24-hour hotline for foreign residents with problems, while 
others just have an office open once a week. Another aspect is the degree to which 
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cities recognize foreign residents as local residents, seek to know their needs, and 
attempt to involve them in the local community. 
Of the four cities, Kawaguchi and Shinjuku give these matters little priority, 
while Kawasaki and Hamamatsu are more proactive. For internationalization to 
have any impact, international offices must involve other institutions in the 
program, but they are often marginalized and have little impact when acting alone. 
Where the international office is located within the administration matters: in 
Shinjuku and Kawaguchi, it is located in the general affairs division, while in 
Kawasaki and Hamamatsu it is located in a more prestigious division of City Hall. 
Regular channels have been established for foreigners to communicate with public 
officials, to explain their problems and goals. These two cities have also done 
more to involve the general public in internationalization, through creating high 
profile organizations. Kawasaki has also published brochures in Japanese which 
state the city’s official policy to include foreigners. 
In the 1960s and 1970s, progressive local governments strengthened ties 
between local officials and citizens, so that the officials had more knowledge than 
previously. Japanese cities began to pursue international exchanges, while also 
introducing policies to help foreigners at home. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
tried to take over international exchange programs, and local government was 
required to set up international exchange sections. These were not to provide a 
basis for the foreign migrants’ incorporation – but this is what has happened. Not 
much of an extension is needed to extend services to new foreign residents. 
Kawasaki was one of the first local governments that refused to comply 
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with the fingerprinting of aliens, because the zainichi community which led the 
opposition to fingerprinting is well organized there, and the local government 
approves of its efforts to support them. After positive experiences working with 
the Koreans, the city set out to develop incorporation programs which would also 
extend to newcomers (Pak 2003: 263). 
Hamamatsu was different because of its ethnic background. Its international 
efforts stemmed from the arrival of a small group of Vietnamese in the early 
1980s. Volunteers took on the work of helping them, and later Nikkeijin, and the 
city developed its reputation for internationalization (Pak 2003: 265). 
What shaped the policy environment? A city’s experience of outside 
interests appears to increase the commitment to internationalization. When recent 
foreign migrants have a generally positive image, it is easy to reach out to them 
through new programs. There is a lot of coverage of these issues by the national 
media, and through collaboration with local intellectuals, social movements and 
activists have worked closely with the city to develop a foreign advisory council. 
Hamamatsu is a major site for studies of Nikkeijin employment and their cultural 
adjustment (Pak 2003: 265).
Shinjuku has had problems with Pakistanis, Iranians and Bangladeshis who 
overstay and become involved in the local construction industries (Pak 2003: 
265). In the 1990s, Iranians became involved in telephone card scams, and 
Chinese gang activities are centered on Shinjuku. Unlike Kawasaki, Shinjuku has 
a reputation for large numbers of foreign migrants engaged in illegal activities. In 
Kawasaki, the foreigners are relatively invisible. So Kawasaki and Hamamatsu 
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have greater ease in helping the migrants. However, despite all this, there are 
limitations to the extent of the incorporation of foreigners, and these are linked to 
ongoing discussions of national identity. 
Nagy’s article (2010) deals with the problems of immigration in Japan. The 
unbalanced and uncontrolled immigration or the potential for it can weaken the 
foundations of the nation. So in order to cope with this, the state has to construct a 
mode of cultural coexistence at national and local levels to integrate foreigners 
into Japanese society. (2010: 150, tabunka kyosei seisaku). On a national level, 
this process is still in its infancy, but at the local level it is more advanced with 
official plans and policies recently introduced. This has to be adapted to the needs 
and direction of each municipality.  He analyzes the process in three areas of 
Metropolitan Tokyo: Shinjuku Ward, Adachi Ward, and Tachikawa City. 
Shinjuku (Nagy 2010: 151-58) has the largest and most culturally diverse 
population of foreigners of the three. At the center of the arrangements is the 
Shinjuku Cultural Coexistence Plaza. The main objective is to ensure that foreign 
residents do not become a burden to the local government and the other Japanese 
residents. The activities and projects that it organizes include Japanese language 
classes, publications of information on the ward and problems of living there, and 
promotion of social networking in Shinjuku. This is to help the foreigners come 
into contact with others foreigners and the local people, reduce the problems 
arising from poor social integration, and allow foreigners to be more independent. 
One of the problems that arose was that the activities of the local government 
overlapped with those of existing foreigners' social networks and they preferred to 
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work through their own networks rather than those of the city. In addition, the 
involvement of the foreigners in the local community was seen as being limited to 
receiving information and access to social welfare, education and other 
government services, but did not extend to political participation or voting rights. 
Foreigners tend to go to ethnic centers to get information where they can talk to 
others in their own languages, and as a result tend to remain isolated from 
Shinjuku social life. Illegal or undocumented migrants do not make full use of 
services providing advice on visas and immigration issues, from the fear that they 
will be forcibly repatriated. The Japanese and the foreigners therefore act not as 
co-residents of Shinjuku, but as hosts and guests. 
In the case of Adachi (Nagy 2010: 158-68), it has changed since the 1980s 
from being a mainly Japanese ward to one with a large population of foreigners. 
Many of the foreigners are Koreans (41%), Chinese (29%), and Filipinos (17%). 
There are also some Thai residents (around 1%). In 2005 the Ward carried out a 
questionnaire, and used the results in designing its multicultural coexistence 
policies. So the emphasis has changed from one on supporting local cultural 
programs to supporting foreign residents. Based on the slogan “Richness and 
Difference”, there have been a series of measures introduced to deal with 
problems concerning communications, lifestyles, and multicultural coexistence. 
Multilingual information is provided at various locations throughout the ward. 
The main aim is to allow foreigners easy access to the various services provided 
by the local government. The creation of a multicultural ward involves the 
creation of networks, and the (informal) opportunity to participate in ward 
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administration and planning. A foreign residents’ advisory board has been 
established to enable this participation. There is also research being carried out on 
how to give permanent residents voting rights, to show that the ward is dedicated 
to at least some measure of civic inclusion. Efforts are also being made to network 
with other organizations in providing aid to foreign residents. 
The foreign groups vary in the extent to which they need these services: for 
instance, Koreans in Japan generally face few difficulties with language and 
culture. However, as in Shinjuku, there is still a tendency for groups of foreigners 
of the same origin to stick together, though the measures taken have allowed a 
greater extent of participation than in Shinjuku, at all levels of politics and society. 
Foreigners are employed on full time basis to act as translators and to provide 
liaison with the city authorities for foreigners. The ward also sponsors cultural 
exchange events, even though there is a tendency in these simply to contrast 
Japanese and foreign cultures. 
In the case of Tachikawa (Nagy 2010: 168-75), Chinese and Koreans also 
make up the majority of the foreign residents, and the city’s four-point plan 
includes multicultural awareness, the creation of a “municipality in which foreign 
residents can live with ease,” promotion of social exchange and networking, and 
encouragement of foreign residents to contribute to the local community. The 
aims are therefore rather similar to those of the other two Tokyo cases. 
Tachikawa’s stated aim is to treat its foreigners not as guests but as residents who 
can contribute to the development of the city as a whole, by protecting their 
human rights and promoting multicultural coexistence. As in the other two cities, 
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despite the emphasis on human rights, there is still no commitment to providing 
full political rights to the foreigners. However, a multicultural coexistence 
committee has been formed, which involves foreign residents, a measure similar 
to that in Adachi. The rationale is that foreign residents pay taxes like the 
Japanese, and so the city should take measures to provide for their specific needs. 
There are also events organized to include foreigners, such as a Japanese speech 
contest, introductions to Japanese culture such as tea ceremony and flower 
arrangement, multicultural festivals, and sister city twinning arrangements. 
However, Nagy argues, despite the intentions of these programs, they still 
emphasize the separation of the Japanese from the foreigners. In addition, they 
center on traditional Japanese culture, which Nagy sees as largely irrelevant for 
living in modern Japan, and they are only arranged for the foreigners, and not for 
all the Japanese residents. Even though the aim of the city is to identify leaders 
among the foreign migrants, the formation of ethnic associations does little to 
integrate them with the rest of the residents, and continues to identify them as 
outsiders. However, Nagy concludes that the continued growth of the foreign 
communities will eventually compel local governments to put into effect policies 
which genuinely meet the needs of the foreign residents. 
4.2 Informal initiatives
In her paper, “NGO support for migrant labor,” Glenda Roberts (2003) 
distinguishes between male and female undocumented workers, and the 
institutions which have arisen to support them. Men and women differ in the 
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extent to which they can get help with violations of human rights. The problem is 
how to create social institutions and open doors that are closed. She further 
differentiates between volunteer-based citizens’ action oriented organizations and 
local labor unions. Both are active in supporting human rights and labor law, and 
organizing programs, but non-union groups have substantial expertise in relation 
to the problems encountered in daily life. Unions focus more narrowly on labor 
issues. 
Her focus is on the Tokyo area and the shelters and unions that concentrate 
on undocumented workers, including Koreans, Thai, and Filipinos. By 1997, there 
were 145 NGOs supporting migrant workers throughout Japan, given that the 
extent to which migrant workers are incorporated into the wider society is very 
varied. Although the general public is not convinced of the benefits of migrants in 
Japan, the NGOS are willing to take on their problems and work for solutions. 
As an example of a union, Zentoitsu was established in 1992, with a membership 
of 20 Bangladeshi, Iranian and Pakistani workers (Roberts 2003: 277-84). This 
was after 1991, when the leadership encountered cases of foreigners injured in 
labor accidents without adequate insurance. Their joint activities have included 
publishing a white paper, and other materials to campaign for migrant workers’ 
rights and attending international conferences to raise awareness of the issue. 
Annual rallies on behalf of foreigners and their rights have been held since 1983. 
The unions take 10 percent of the settlements they arrange. The most typical 
problems are unpaid wages, sudden dismissal, and labor accidents. Japanese 
workers find themselves in difficulties and can often resolve them without unions, 
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but because of the language barrier, foreigners are unable to use the system 
without the expertise and advocacy of the union. 
Foreign workers are unlikely to form their own branch union in future, as 
only workers with legitimate visas can take on this role. There is also often 
factionalism among the members based on ethnic and class differences, e.g. 
between blue- and white-collar workers. Expanding the membership may be 
difficult, as unions have problems in collecting the dues. Social movements need 
continual support if they are to take off and achieve their goals.
As for the women migrants (Roberts 2003: 284-94), their work is often 
stigmatized from legal and social viewpoint, and legal means to protect the rights 
of women foreign workers often absent or inaccessible. Basically many of them 
are involved in sex work: they are often tricked into coming into Japan, and given 
conditions in the sex industry, they often find that their movements are curtailed. 
Factory and construction workers in contrast are usually able to move around, but 
women are beyond the framework of socially legitimate work. 
One change Roberts notes is that, whereas a few years ago women coming 
to shelters sought assistance in returning home, by 2000 they were coming for 
help with problems legalizing their stay in Japan, and they tended to have 
children. She also mentions that an increasing number of women had mental 
health problems. In 1998, a quarter of the women sheltered had been sex workers 
prior to seeking shelter. A majority of the women seeking shelter were from 
Thailand and the Philippines – and more recently, the majority was from Thailand. 
The reason she suggests for the increase in Thai women is that they tend to have 
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fewer support networks available in Japan. The Filipinas have better support from 
the Catholic Church and other religious groups. Thai women typically arrive on 
tourist visas and so are not covered by contractual benefits which the 
entertainment visa carries with it. 
Help, one of the shelters Roberts studied, dated from 1986 (Roberts 2003: 
286-90), and the main financial contributors were foundations and church 
organizations. Since 1990, it had some support from Tokyo Municipal 
Government. Its policy is to support the independence and equality of women. 
The shelter had recently been given a face lift, with more color, furniture, facilities 
and a TV, and the women living under duress appreciated this. Women who stayed 
at the shelter felt at home. Women from foreign countries were not charged, unlike 
the Japanese. The funding from foundations and local government also helped in 
regard to the immigration office and the police: the grant from the city 
government gave the organization respectability so the police and immigration 
office treated them with more respect.
In the other two organizations, Mizura and Sala (Roberts 2003: 290-93), the 
women staying there were responsible for cooking and cleaning themselves. 
Comparing the organizations which receive government funding with those that 
do not, the fundamental difference is that Mizura was a local union dealing with 
women’s employment problems, and was therefore dealing with problems of 
gender and dismissal. The funding was based on donations and membership dues, 
but there was an increasing cash shortage as fewer single women had been 
seeking shelter, and more mothers with children had been turning up. Mizura had 
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negotiated with the city social welfare office to help look after the children, even 
if the women were overstayers. They also collaborated with government in other 
ways. The official policy on overstayers was that they are not allowed to stay in 
state supported facilities, so they were sent on to Mizura and Sala. Public 
employees urged the NGOs to make services available to foreigners, whether 
documented or undocumented. Another area of collaboration was in training –the 
local government sent staff to the NGOs so that they could find out how to 
circumvent the rules and be more effective. In addition, the people running the 
shelters took local government staff to the immigration office to show them how 
tough it is. Informal relationships were also helping officials in wealthier districts 
– because they did not understand why foreign women might not have a passport, 
or why women who were divorced did not want to go home. In other words the 
shelters helped educate the public officials about the real problems. However, 
another problem was that officials were frequently shifted to different jobs so that 
there was a loss in expertise. NGOs therefore acted as buffers between the 
immigrants and the immigration officials, and lobbied local officials to make 
arrests and detention procedures less traumatic. 
Help organized lecture tours of its facilities and educated the public on 
double standards in sex and morals/behavior: tolerance of male sexuality 
contributes to strong sex and entertainment industries, but criminalizes those that 
work in them. There was need to rethink assumptions about sex, gender and 
family relationships. Before, migrant women generally wanted to go home after 
broken marriages, but now they wanted to live on in Japan permanently and 
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independently, so the public had lost interest in them as a group in need of help. 
The shelters also organized a national network with solidarity for migrant workers 
composed of 66 groups and 72 individual members – this network was lobbying 
the national government to improve the situation of migrant workers and their 
families. Japan’s NGOs encouraged citizens to look at their relations with the 
foreigners who were providing essential services in construction etc. People who 
saw this were thought to be more open to living in a society which is multicultural 
and multiethnic.  
Dizon (2005, 2006) discusses women’s support groups among women from 
the Philippines. The labor exporting policy of the Philippines government was 
started by the Marcos regime in the 1970s: as they grew in number, the formation 
of Filipina migrant communities in Japan led to the formation of social networks 
and support groups. According to Dizon, they play a big role in the development 
of interpersonal relations between the migrants and the international relationships 
between Japanese and Filipinos. Her 2005 paper is about the role of social 
networks as agents of social change. For most of the Filipino migrants, these 
networks are an important source of strength and support. Her case study focuses 
on Damayan (“help” in Tagalog), founded in Sendai in 1991. There were already 
reports of domestic abuse from Filipinas living in Sendai because of their 
employment situation and bad housing. There was a high possibility of meeting 
husbands, but even after marriage they experienced discrimination from Japanese 
employers, their in-laws, and even other Filipinos. Because of the situation, they 
wanted to found an institution which would help them adjust to their lives in 
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Japan, including the Japanese way of life, culture and tradition. Membership 
would also allow them to contact people from their own country and come 
together in group meetings. At the start there were about 15 members, all of them 
married to Japanese men, and the founder was a Japanese woman, Kumiyama-san. 
Despite conflicts within the group, the members all greatly respected her. 
Damayan serves as a support system in cases of domestic abuse, and it has also 
supported members going before the courts. The membership fee is 6,000 yen, 
with that they finance their activities. The Filipina housewives bring their families 
with them to meetings and invite Japanese friends, so this promotes Filipino 
culture and tradition and allows them to share them with other people. They also 
try to promote cultural understanding and awareness. 
As Dizon mentions, most Philippine migrants still have strong bonds with 
their families and home towns, so that they also send remittances to fulfill family 
obligations back home and make investments in families, buildings and cars. 
However, these investments also cause friction with their husbands, so that they 
eventually want to go back and settle in the Philippines. 
One of the main problems they face is the lack of acceptance of these 
women by the state as active participants in Japanese society. Also there is the 
stereotyping of Filipinas as entertainers, even though they have high levels of 
education in some cases, and many women have never been engaged in this type 
of activity. So they basically find that Japanese society allocates them lower status 
along with other Asian migrants in general. Although they want to stay in Japan, it 
is difficult because of perceived discrimination. As a conclusion she says that 
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these factors leave them in a difficult situation – they cannot go home to live nor 
can they be accepted as citizens in Japan. 
In the future, Kumiyama-san wants to establish a day center for all the women, 
and there will be a need for these kinds of services in relation to the Japanese 
population – which can also serve for Filipinas as a place to work. The people 
who get help from Damayan are not restricted to the immediate members. It is 
advantageous to be a member of a social network because migrants can learn 
about the benefits and help available to them, and it can also help them in case of 
law suits or difficulties with domestic violence, as well as with access to subsidies 
and services from local government. In addition, the church performs a unifying 
function for the migrants, not only in Sendai but in other parts of Japan.
As a conclusion, Dizon (2004: 82) says that it is important to analyze the 
importance of networks by trying to understand migration processes: migrant 
women through these networks form links and networks through which they can 
communicate, exchange their experiences, and can get better access to 
opportunities in Japan and elsewhere. 
4.3 Summary
Chapter 4 has described some of the responses of the national government 
to population decline and the entry of immigrants into the country, both at the 
national and local level. What is clear from the case studies presented is that while 
national government can make policies in the areas such as assimilation and 
agreements with foreign governments, it is left to the local level to deal with the 
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day to day problems of migrants living in Japan. Other government programs 
have included measures to stimulate the flow of students, some of whom they 
hope will stay and work in Japan after graduation, with initiatives such as the 
recent G-30 efforts to increase the number of foreign students dramatically. How 
far these will be successful in the face of government budget cuts must remain in 
doubt – the G-30 may well remain the G-13 program, with no additions to the 
present list of universities participating. 
Meanwhile local authorities are concerned with the idea of “foreigners are 
citizens too) and are making efforts to integrate them into local society. As the 
papers by Nagy and Pak show, these vary from local authority to local authority, 
and indeed many of them are impatient of the lack of central government 
involvement in these projects. Many of these efforts are well-meaning and 
probably do give many migrants access to language skills and information which 
they otherwise would not have. As some scholars have indicated, however, some 
of the cultural initiatives still tend to draw a line between the Japanese and their 
“Others” by emphasizing the cultural differences rather than similarities. Perhaps 
more successful for many migrants are the efforts of the NGOs described by 
Roberts and others, especially for those migrants that have social or economic 
problems in their lives in Japan.
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Chapter 5. Conclusion
“Immigration of culturally diverse people presents nation-states with a dilemma:  
incorporation of the newcomers as citizens may undermine myths of cultural  
homogeneity; but failur to incorporate them may lead to divided societies, marked  
by severe inequality and conflict.” (Castles and Miller 2003: 40-41)
5.0 Introduction 
The final chapter summarizes the arguments, and considers the most likely 
scenarios for the development of the Japanese population, the labor market, and 
immigration in the future. As the United Nations and others have shown, the 
Japanese working population is now in decline, and this is likely to accelerate for 
some time in the 21st century. The foreign population of Japan is rising, but not 
fast enough to make up for the shortfall in domestic fertility, let alone allow the 
population to start growing again. Even some professional areas like nursing and 
the medical professions are already short of trained staff, and this has been 
recognized in the Japanese government’s willingness to allow Filipina nurses to 
train and work in Japan – even if the program has been very limited so far. 
Government policies to increase the birth rate have produced few results, and the 
populations of many rural communities, particularly in the North of the country, 
are still in rapid decline – aided in eastern Tohoku by the recent earthquake and 
associated disasters. Even though many in Japan are worried about the likely 
effects of large-scale immigration, it still seems the easiest way to stem Japan’s 
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current population decline.
At the outset of the thesis, the following questions were posed. In what 
follows, I try to give the answers based on the information presented in the main 
chapters of the thesis. 
What has been the impact of population decline on Japanese society? 
Many of the results of population decline were discussed in chapter 2 of the 
thesis. The results of population decline throughout Japanese society have been 
far reaching and are potentially catastrophic. The country is losing its competitive 
edge as the numbers of young people decline, while at the same time seeing an 
increase in the numbers of the elderly who increasingly have to be cared for. As 
the chapters on the rural areas show, population decline is leading to the collapse 
of rural communities, and families. The old caring family mechanisms have in 
many cases broken down, leading to tension and conflict between the generations, 
including old people in the rural areas and their young kin living in the cities. 
There are particular shortages of workers in the caring professions such as nurses 
who have to take the place of the family in the care of the elderly, in the 3-D jobs 
in the construction industry and elsewhere, which many Japanese, particularly the 
highly educated, are no longer interested in. Much of the shortfall has been met by 
undocumented workers, and one of the main challenges facing the Japanese 
government is to adjust policies so that workers who are needed can come into the 
country legally to work. The Japanese government has attempted a strategy 
similar to that of other countries in the region, in inviting and attracting talent in 
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through the educational system, but the small numbers who have arrived so far 
suggests that this will not do much to make up for the shortfall.
What have been the main patterns of migration to and from Japan 
historically, and what are the most important contemporary flows in and out 
of Japan? 
The main patterns of migration to and from Japan were discussed in chapter 
3 of the thesis. Historically, many of the migrants to Japan, even before the Edo 
period, came from Korea and China, due to proximity and cultural similarity, and 
this remained the case after the Meiji restoration when the country opened up. 
With the expansion of the Japanese empire in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, 
Japan like other imperial powers generally imported labor from its own colonies, 
even through many of them left the country at the end of WWII, as Japanese 
settlers throughout the empire returned. Even with the postwar period, the 
dominant ethnic groups coming into the country were still Koreans and Chinese, 
though joined by new groups such as the Filipinas and Thai (mainly females) and 
the Nikkeijin – allowed in because of their supposed cultural similarity. With the 
strength of the Japanese economy and the emergence of internal migration 
patterns from rural to urban areas, jobs in labor intensive industries like 
construction and production became more attractive to people from the Middle 
East, including Iran in the 1980s and 1990s. However, with the long recession in 
the Japanese economy, many of the undocumented workers of the bubble 
economy period have gone to other parts of the world, leaving an increasingly 
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diverse foreign population in a variety of jobs.
What ethnic and national minorities are now resident in Japan, what are 
their main social characteristics, and in what kind of niches in the labor 
market are they primarily employed?
These issues were also discussed in chapter 3. The four main groups of 
migrants in Japan have rather different characteristics. 
Many of the Koreans in Japan are Zainichi, born in Japan, many of whom 
have limited contact with, or interest in, Korea, especially in the third and fourth 
generations. Many have now taken Japanese names, and even Japanese 
citizenship. In other words they have assimilated fast. 
The Chinese were also “oldcomers” but in recent years, the flow of Chinese 
migrants into Japan has increased, and they have now become the largest single 
foreign ethnic groups. As Liu-Farrer’s work shows, an increasing number of them 
have professional qualifications. Many of them are educated in Japan, and they act 
as bridges between Japanese companies and businesses back home in China. They 
are becoming an increasingly important part of the resident foreign workforce. 
The main trends of migration are shown in Appendix 21. 
A third major group is the Nikkeijin, who were allowed to enter and stay in 
Japan on the grounds that they were Japanese in ancestry and therefore likely to 
be similar in culture. As Tsuda (2003) has shown, the reality is different, and even 
though the Japanese in Brazil thought of themselves as Japanese, in Japan they are 
thought of as Brazilians – and culturally different. Many are concentrated in the 
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manufacturing industries in the Tokyo, Aichi and Kansai areas. 
A fourth major group is the Filipinos. They are interesting because a 
large number of them were women, who came to Japan to work in the 
entertainment industry. This lasted until Japan reduced the number of 
entertainment visas in 2004, in response to international pressure because of the 
association between Filipinas and the sex industry. Many Filipinas have married 
Japanese husbands, and have permanent residence in Japan through their children 
who are Japanese citizens. Gradually the Japanese government is moving towards 
the legalization of Filipino migration, through encouraging the arrival of care 
workers – especially nurses, even though the numbers so far have been small.
Other smaller groups also have distinctive job patterns – the Thai migrants 
are largely women, with patterns similar to those of the Filipinas. The Nepalis are 
involved in chain migration, and at the moment are moving in large numbers into 
the restaurant industry. 
Finally there are a large number of highly educated professionals in Japan 
from the western countries – perhaps the biggest single group being the JET 
program English teachers, many of whom stayed on in Japan in various 
professional jobs once their contracts had ended. 
What has been the government response to population change, both at the 
national and local level? In particular, what attitudes to migration have 
developed at the grass roots level, in local administrations, and what 
initiatives have they put in place to support the integration of the migrants?
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The response of the Japanese state has been ambiguous, within the 
framework of the Basic Immigration Control Plan: on the one hand the migration 
of skilled migrants is officially encouraged, but the kinds of 3-D workers that the 
country really needs are still prevented from entering. The attitude of local 
government is different. As Thompson (2003) shows, a loss of population in rural 
communities and small towns means a loss of revenue, so foreigners are welcome 
from the fiscal point of view, in addition to the work that they do. Small towns 
and villages have been creative in trying to reverse the outmigration of younger 
people, and so even Filipina wives of local farmers, as described by Faier (2009), 
are a welcome addition to the local population. City governments as described by 
Nagy and Pak have made considerable efforts to smooth the entry and integration 
of the foreign workforce, even if the results vary between cities and are patchy in 
their success. There are also the private sector NGOs set up to support and help 
the migrants, in addition to their own social networks and social institutions such 
as the church. 
5.1 Future scenarios and options
According to the United Nations Population Division Report (2001), Japan 
could play a leading role in finding ways of revamping the labor market and social 
system and coping with demographic change in an aging society, before other 
countries or regions will be confronted by the same challenge. Since the end of 
the bubble economy, there has been a decrease in employment, coupled with 
deflation. Wage levels have been stagnant, or have even fallen in some cases. 
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Even employment which requires higher levels of skills is no longer safe. The 
erosion of the Japanese hiring system (leading to employment directly after 
university) and the poor economic environment have cost a whole generation of 
young people of reproductive age a certain future, and many have been turned 
involuntarily into NEETs, part-time workers, or furiita. Others have had to accept 
poorly paid jobs in ordered to get hired. Probably, the employment situation for 
the young would have been much worse, if it had not been for the declining birth 
rate at the same time. In some cases, young people have to compete with older age 
groups, as their employment has also become uncertain: McDonalds Japan 
employs thousands of retired people on the basis of short-term contracts, 
traditionally a student occupation. The jobs that are available are very often in the 
3-D category, which do not attract younger high school and university graduates. 
Once they were filled by migrants from the rural areas, but from the 1980s they 
have increasingly been filled by migrants from overseas. 
Despite the prerequisites set down by the immigration law and the position 
of the government that only skilled workers should be allowed in, not all the 
foreign migrants actually work in the skilled and professional sectors of the labor 
market. Rates of university education in Japan are high by comparison with other 
highly industrialized programs. In addition, public programs aimed at increasing 
the skill sets of the unemployed and underemployed Japanese have allowed them 
to move up the ladder to more prestigious and better paid jobs. This has 
accelerated the movement of Japanese out of jobs at the bottom of the labor 
market, as the numbers in the working-age population picks fall increasingly 
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rapidly. In other words, the immigrants are filling the holes that the upwardly 
mobile young Japanese are leaving behind.
These trends are general, but some sectors of the labor market are suffering 
more than others. It is particularly serious in the medical profession as more old, 
but not necessarily sick, people are in need of long term medical treatment and 
domestic help. The scarcity of medical personnel in the more peripheral areas of 
the country has already reached critical levels (see Editorial: Fixing doctor 
shortage, asahi.com).
Below I discuss the most likely Japanese policy options in this situation, 
with their respective advantages and disadvantages. In response to demographic 
changes, there are three main strategic approaches: an increase in the number of 
children, an increase in immigration, or changes in social and economic policy to 
allow society to adapt.
The real question is how, given the present trends, can Japanese society 
maintain (or even expand) its prosperity in the future. This depends on the number 
of children. The question of how many children someone can and wants can 
hardly be dissociated from the issue of associated costs, particularly direct costs of 
education and other indirect costs. If the government wants to raise the birth rate 
in the longer term, it will have to improve conditions for families and ensure that 
children are not seen primarily as a burden. Pure transfer payments, such as child 
allowances, are not enough. Young couples need security by providing them with 
high-quality and affordable education and welfare infrastructure.
The situation of the Japanese labor market continues to be unsatisfactory in 
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comparison with earlier decades. If, because of the stagnant economy, employees' 
incomes are not rising, and if the declining and aging population is putting 
pressure on tax revenues and social security contributions, there will be many 
adverse consequences. 
Various new measures have been introduced to keep up the birthrate and 
persuade people to have more babies, including child allowances, education, the 
“Golden Plan,” subsidized births and so on, but so far none of them have had the 
desired effect. “While the conventional family ideology and the expectations of 
old-age support from children persist, it has become increasingly difficult for 
women to work, look after children, and care for elderly parents. As a result, the 
employment of live-in domestic workers has become a common de facto mode of 
providing care for the elderly” (Toyota 2008: 168).
Success in the fight against unemployment will also considerably help 
mitigate the problems caused by demographic change for social security systems. 
If Japan succeeds in exploiting the reservoir of previously unemployed labor more 
fully, then it can partly counteract demographic-related revenue losses in the 
pension, health and care insurance systems.
The problems are worst in the rural areas, where the population is in many 
cases already collapsing, as in Akita (Mock 2008). Many strategies of rural 
revitalization have been tried, with patchy results, as shown in the case studies of 
rural communities discussed above. There is much discussion in Japan of 
generating new settlers in the rural areas by promoting rural industries or tourism, 
but for many communities these may not help in the long run. The much smaller 
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Japanese population which is predicted for later this century could easily fit into 
the current urban housing stock. This suggests that large parts of the country will 
in fact become depopulated, and the rural areas that will be most viable are those 
near the large cities and the motorway and railway systems. 
Immigration remains the means by which the labor force can be increased 
most rapidly, and many of the 3-D jobs are already carried out by migrants. 
Probably the government should increase the number of job categories available 
to migrants, and there have already been moves in this direction. But Japan is 
already in competition with other countries for the most highly skilled labor, and 
other countries facing the same difficulties have developed better images and 
reputations as migrant destinations earlier than Japan. Other Asian countries, 
which have been the primary sources of migrants in the past, already have, or will 
have, their own demographic crises during the course of this century. As their 
economies and general prosperity levels increase, these improved conditions will 
increasingly allow them to compete with Japan as an attractive place to live and 
work.
Despite the public’s worries about increasing levels of migration, most 
studies conclude that, even under more adverse conditions, on balance, the 
contribution of immigrants to the economy is positive. Historically, the proportion 
of immigrants from China and Korea in Japan has been high, but as economic 
growth in those countries continues to forge ahead, they will see Japan as a less 
promising country in which to live and work.
In any case, studies of replacement migration and the levels of movement 
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required, such as the UN report, have shown that current immigration levels, or 
even much greater numbers, cannot, and most likely never will, compensate for 
Japan's birth deficit. In any case, pressure to stabilize or reduce immigration will 
come both from nationalist politicians and from the less educated and qualified 
Japanese workers who fear being replaced by foreign workers: competitive 
pressure on wage levels from immigrants will mean that these Japanese workers 
will increasingly be unable to make ends meet.
On the other hand, the future could be positive for younger people and 
foreign nationals, as population decline will increase their bargaining power and 
force employers to improve their hiring procedures, as well as forcing government 
to abolish what are, from their viewpoint, unreasonable barriers to entry and 
employment.
While other developed nations have courted foreign skilled workers for 
years, some even for decades, and can rely on their international reputations, 
Japan is not widely known as a society that embraces immigrants, even those like 
the Nikkejin of Japanese descent. For many years, the auto industry has used 
“trainees” from abroad as a source of cheap labor, but the majority of trainees felt 
used or mistreated. They complain about low wages, lack of leisure time and 
insecure employment, and this does nothing to improve Japan’s image in the eyes 
of potential migrants with choices available elsewhere.
As the major industrial nations engage in a race to raise their birthrates, 
repopulate, and revitalize their labor force, Japan is facing increasing competition 
in the manufacturing and electronics sector with China’s rise. Already today, 
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China is heavily involved in cooperation projects across the globe and projecting 
its economic power internationally. Meanwhile, Japan has to come to terms with 
the limitations of what it can do within its own power. It could be that the future 
lies in greater regional cooperation, with the movement of goods and services 
across borders, which is a prominent feature of the European Union. In order to 
further collaborate with e.g. China and South Korea, it will need to settle long-
standing historical disputes with both neighbors, given that the three countries 
(together with Taiwan) are becoming increasingly integrated economically. It 
could be, therefore, that in a globalized world, the only real solution to national 
problems is regional collaboration, without which it will be impossible to solve 
the kinds of demographic problems which Japan is facing.
Japan only accommodates a relatively small percentage of foreigners 
compared with other major industrial countries (1.71% in 2009, see Appendix 20), 
and many of them, particularly the Koreans, were actually born in Japan, 
distinguished from the rest of the general population only by the color of their 
passports and their citizen rights. Despite this, the idea of mass immigration is still 
opposed by many conservative politicians. The notion of ethnic homogeneity has 
obsessed politicians in Japan for decades – but now they have to rethink this, in 
order to allow in more foreign workers. "Our Constitution grants those with 
Japanese nationality voting rights in return for their obligation to pay taxes […] 
Granting suffrage to those without Japanese nationality is clearly a mistake in 
national policy" (Tadamori 2010). 
However, Prime Minister Naoto Kan's New Growth Strategy (Targets) do 
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take into account the need to accept foreign labor (National Policy Unit). They 
include
• Boosting the annual number of foreign visitors to 30 million
• Establishing Japan's reputation as a leading provider of medical 
examinations and advanced medical care in Asia
• Doubling the number of highly skilled foreign personnel in Japan
• Accepting 300,000 foreign students, and dispatching 300,000 Japanese 
youngsters abroad
In recent years, there has also been the LPD initiative (2008) to accept 10 million 
immigrants in the next 50 years (Matsutani 2008).
Certainly an increase in migration would help reduce the general age of the 
population, even if only by a small amount. Appendix 18 shows that the largest 
age groups of the foreign population are under 40. Compared to the average age 
of the general population, the median age of the foreign population living in Japan 
is lower: in Appendix 18, the median is in the 30s: compared with the national 
figure of 44.5).
If immigration on a mass scale is to be allowed, it is increasingly important 
to provide educational qualifications for every possible candidate. Family and 
social background are of growing importance for a child’s employment prospects. 
In Japan, foreign-born migrant children have lower educational attainments than 
Japanese children. Children of immigrants have problems in school because of 
insufficient language proficiency, a drawback that haunts them while entering the 
labor market. However, there are market niches available: Japanese generally have 
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little desire to become entrepreneurs, and Japanese young people prefer to work 
for companies rather than risk starting a business. The children of immigrants 
(involuntarily) take that chance, and a higher proportion become entrepreneurs, 
for instance running small restaurants (cf. Fukuoka 2000: 135).
Therefore social integration is necessary for the improvement of their living 
conditions, as more people settle and have more children, and as they contribute 
with their taxes to the well being of the whole society.
A new immigration policy would be for them a major advantage. The 
question should therefore no longer be whether Japan should be willing to control 
economic migration, but only how and how quickly Japan can become established 
as a leading competitor for the best minds in the global market. Given the 
problems of the past, it will require a long time before Japan is regarded by the 
highly qualified as an attractive destination and be included in any serious 
consideration.
107
References
Asgari, Behrooz et al. (2010). Global Economy and Labor Force Migration: The 
Case of Iranian Workers in Japan. In Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific  
Studies, Vol. 27, pp. 31-52.
Bartram, David (2000). Japan and Labor Migration: Theoretical and 
Methodological Implications of Negative Cases. In International Migration 
Review, Vol. 34, No. 1, pp. 5-32.
Befu, Harumi (2000). Globalization as human dispersal: From the perspective of 
Japan. In J.S. Eades et al. (eds.), Globalization and Social Change in  
Contemporary Japan. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, pp. 17-40.
Burgess, Chris (2008). (Re)constructing Boundaries: International Marriage in 
Yamagata as Agents of Multiculturalism. In N. Graburn et al. (eds.), 
Multiculturalism in the New Japan. New York: Berghahn, pp. 63-81.
Castles, Stephen and Mark J. Miller (2003). The Age of Migration:International  
Population Movements in the Modern World (3rd ed.). London: Palgrave.
Chitose, Yoshimi (2006). Demographic profiles of Brazilians and their children in 
Japan. In The Japanese Journal of Population, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 93-114.
Coleman, Samuel (1992). Family Planning in Japanese Society: Traditional Birth  
Control in a Modern Urban Culture (2nd ed.). Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.
Cortez, Michael Angelo A. (2010). Migration under the Japan-Philippines Free 
Trade Agreement. In P. Kee and H. Yoshimatsu (eds.), Global Movements in  
108
the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 181-99.
Council for the Promotion of Measures for Foreign Residents (2009). Promotion 
of Support Measures for Foreign Residents in Japan. Cabinet Office,  
Government of Japan, 2009/04/16, available at http://www8.cao.go.jp/teiju-
portal/eng/taisaku/outline.html#2.
Dizon, Jane Garcia (2004). Associations and Social Networks: Filipina Migrants 
in Sendai. In Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, Vol. 14, pp. 75-
83.
Dizon, Jane Garcia (2006). Revisiting the OPA Phenomenon: What Next for 
Filipino Migrant Workers to Japan? In Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific  
Studies, Vol. 20, pp. 69-84.
Douglass, Mike and Glenda S. Roberts (2003). Japan in a global age of migration. 
In M. Douglass and G. Roberts (eds.), Japan and Global Migration. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, pp. 3-37.
Douglass, Mike and Glenda S. Roberts (eds.) (2003). Japan and Global 
Migration: Foreign Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society. 
Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press.
Economist Intelligence Unit (2008). Global Migration Barometer: Methodology, 
Results & Findings. Economic Intelligence Unit, 2008/08, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/meetings/seventhcoord2008/GMB_ExecSumEIU
.pdf.
Editorial: Fixing doctor shortage. Asahi Shimbun, 2010/10/16, available at 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201010150343.html.
109
Faier, Lieba (2009). Intimate Encounters: Filipina Women and the Remaking of  
Rural Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Fielding, Tony (2010). The occupational and geographical location of 
transnational immigrant minorities in Japan. In P. Kee and H. Yoshimatsu 
(eds.), Global Movements in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific, 
pp. 93-121.
Fukawa, Tetsuo (2008). The Effects of the Low Birth Rate on the Japanese Social 
Security System. In The Japanese Journal of Social Security Policy, Vol. 7, 
No. 2; pp. 57-66.
Fukuoka, Yasunori (2000). Lives of young Koreans in Japan. Melbourne: Trans 
Pacific Press.
George, Timothy S. (2006). Minamata: Pollution and the Struggle for Democracy  
in Postwar Japan. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Asia Center.
Gill, Tom (2000). Yoseba and Ninpudashi: Changing Patterns of Employment on 
the Fringes of the Japanese Economy. In J.S. Eades et al. (eds.), 
Globalization and Social Change in Contemporary Japan. Melbourne: 
Trans Pacific Press, pp. 123-42.
Gill, Tom (2001). Men of Uncertainty: The Social Organization of Day Laborers  
in Contemporary Japan. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
Goto, Junichi (2007). Latin Americans of Japanese Origin (Nikkeijin) Working in 
Japan – A Survey. World Bank, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
4203, 2007/04, available at http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/IW3P/IB/2007/05/10/000
110
016406_20070510133229/Rendered/PDF/wps4203.pdf.
Hayashi, Nozomu and Masamichi Maeji (2011). Top Rich 'flyjins' abandon Japan, 
flee to Hong Kong. Asahi Shimbun, 2011/04/07, available at 
http://www.asahi.com/english/TKY201104060141.html.
Hicks, George (1997a). The Comfort Women: Japan's Brutal regime of Enforce  
Prostitution in the Second World War. New York: Norton.
Hicks, George (1997b). Japan’s Hidden Apartheid: The Korean Minority and the  
Japanese. Aldershot, UK: Ashgate.
Higuchi, Naoto [n.d.]. Mass Unemployment of Japanese Latin American as a  
Disaster made by Humans: The Consequences of Labor-market  
Flexibilisation during the Economic Crisis in Japan; Unpublished seminar 
paper, Centre of Migration, Policy and Society; University of Oxford; 
available at 
http://www.compas.ox.ac.uk/fileadmin/files/pdfs/Non_WP_pdfs/Events_2009/Ann
ual_Conference/G_Higuchi_Mass%20Unemplyment%20of%20Japanese%20Latin
%20Americans.pdf.
Immigration Bureau (2010). Immigration Control Report 2010: Part1 Immigration 
Control in Recent Years. Ministry of Justice, available at 
http://www.moj.go.jp/content/000058063.pdf.
Itoh, Mayumi (2000). Globalization of Japan: Japanese Sakoku Mentality and 
U.S. Efforts to Open Japan. New York: Macmillan.
Japan Today (2010). Education burdens on rise among Japanese families. Japan 
Today, 2010/11/27, available at 
http://www.japantoday.com/category/national/view/education-burdens-on-rise-
111
among-japanese-families.
Kajimoto, Tetsushi (2011). S&P cuts Japan sovereign rating. Reuters, 2011/01/27, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/01/27/us-japan-economy-debt-
idUSTRE70Q23V20110127.
Kaneko, Ryuichi et al. (2008). Population Projections for Japan: 2006-2055 
Outline of Results, Methods, and Assumptions. In The Japanese Journal of  
Population, Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 76-114.
Kee, Pookong and Hidetaka Yoshimatsu (eds.) (2010). Global Movements in the  
Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific.
Knight, John (2003). Repopulating the Village? In J. Traphagan and J. Knight 
(eds.), Demographic Change and the Family in Japan's Aging Society. 
Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, pp. 107-24.
Knight, John (2006). Waiting for Wolves in Japan: An Anthropological Study of  
People-Wildlife Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Kudo, Masako (2008). Negotiation of Difference in “Multicultural” Japan: 
Japanese women Converted to Islam through International Marriage. In S. 
Yamashita et al. (eds.), Transnational Migration in East Asia. Osaka: 
National Museum of Ethnology, pp. 113-22.
Liu-Farrer, Gracia (2010). Between Privilege and Prejudice: Chinese Immigration 
in Corporate Japan’s Transnational Economy. In P. Kee and H. Yoshimatsu 
(eds.), Global Movements in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific, 
pp. 123-46.
Matanle, Peter (2006). Organic Sources for the Revitalization of Rural Japan: The 
112
Craft Potter of Sado. In Japanstudien, Vol. 18, pp. 149-80.
Matsutani, Minoru (2008). Radical immigration plan under discussion. Japan 
Times, 2008/06/19, available at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-
bin/nn20080619f1.html.
McKean, Margaret A. (1983). Environmental Politics and Citizen Protest in  
Japan. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Minami, Makito (2008). Overstaying Undocumented Workers on the Decrease in 
Japan: The Case of Nepali Immigrant Workers. In S. Yamashita et al. (eds.), 
Transnational Migration in East Asia. Osaka: National Museum of 
Ethnology, pp. 89-99.
Miyazaki, Koji (2008). An aging society and migration to Asia and Oceania. In S. 
Yamashita et al. (eds.), Transnational Migration in East Asia. Osaka: 
National Museum of Ethnology, pp. 139-49.
Mock, John (2005). American universities in Japan. In J.S. Eades et al. (eds.), The 
'Big Bang' in Japanese Higher Education. Melbourne: Trans Pacific Press, 
pp. 183-98.
Mock, John (2008). Multicultural Education. In S. Yamashita et al. (eds.), 
Transnational Migration in East Asia. Osaka: National Museum of 
Ethnology, pp. 123-36.
Nagy, Stephen Robert (2010). Multicultural Coexistence Policies: Responses of 
Local Governments in the Tokyo Metropolitan Area to the Pressures of 
International Immigration. In P. Kee and H. Yoshimatsu (eds.), Global  
Movements in the Asia Pacific. Singapore: World Scientific, pp. 147-79.
113
National Policy Unit (NPU) (n.d.). New Growth Strategy, Strong Economy, 
Robust Public Finances & Strong Social Security System. National Policy  
Unit, available at 
http://www.npu.go.jp/policy/policy04/pdf/20100618_shinseityou_gaiyou_eigo.pdf
#page=4.
Nippon Keidanren (2003). Japan 2025: Envisioning A Vibrant, Attractive Nation 
in the Twenty-First Century. Nippon Keidanren, available at 
http://www.keidanren.or.jp/english/policy/vision2025.pdf. 
Nishioka, Hachiro et al. (2011). Population Projections of Prefectures in Japan: 
2005-2035 Outline of Results and Methods. In The Japanese Journal of  
Population, Vol. 9, No. 1, pp. 1-39.
OECD (2011). International Migration Outlook.  p. 294-95, available at 
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/44/13/48351340.pdf.
Ogawa, Naohiro and Noriyuki Takayama (2005). Demography and Ageing. 
Tokyo: Hitotsubashi University, available at http://www.ier.hit-
u.ac.jp/~takayama/English/pdf/text.pdf.
Ono, Mayumi (2008). Long-Stay Tourism and International Retirement 
Migration: Japanese Retirees in Malaysia. In S. Yamashita et al. (eds.), 
Transnational Migration in East Asia. Osaka: National Museum of 
Ethnology, pp. 151-62.
Pak, Katherine Tegtmeyer (2003). Foreigners are local citizens, too: local 
governments respond to international migration in Japan. In M. Douglass 
and G. Roberts (eds.), Japan and Global Migration. Honolulu: University of 
114
Hawaii Press, pp. 244-74.
Roberts, Glenda S. (2003). NGO support for migrant labor in Japan. In M. 
Douglass and G. Roberts (eds.), Japan and Global Migration. Honolulu: 
University of Hawaii Press, pp. 275-300.
Robine, Jean-Marie and Yasuhiko Saito (2003). Survival Beyond Age 100: The 
Case of Japan. In Population and Development Review, Vol. 29, pp.  New 
York: Population Council, available at 
http://www.popcouncil.org/pdfs/PDRSupplements/Vol29_LifeSpan/Robine_pp208-
228.pdf.
Rogers, Simon (2010). National debt and deficit data for every OECD country. 
Guardian.co.uk, 27 May 2010, available at 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/datablog/2010/may/27/debt-deficit-oecd-
countries-data.
Ruenkaew, Pataya (2002). Female Thai Migrants in Japan. In Journal of Gender  
Studies, Vol. 5, pp. 47-69.
Ryang, Sonia (1997). North Koreans in Japan: Language, Ideology, and Identity. 
Boulder: Westview Press.
Sakanaka, Hidenori (2005). The Future of Japan’s Immigration Policy: a battle 
diary. Japan Focus, available at http://www.japanfocus.org/-Sakanaka-
Hidenori/2396. 
Sato, Ryuzabura, Noriko Shiraishi and Rieko Bando (2008). Induced Abortion in  
Japan: A Demographic Analysis of Its Trends and Causes. Tokyo: National 
Institute of Population and Social Security Research, available at 
115
http://epc2008.princeton.edu/download.aspx?submissionId=80169.
Shintani, Roxana (2005). The Japanese Migration to Peru: Historical Implications 
for Peruvian Nikkei Community. In Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific  
Studies; Vol. 18, pp. 107-22.
Shintani, Roxana (2006). The Nikkei Community in Peru since 1945. In 
Ritsumeikan Journal of Asia Pacific Studies, Vol. 20, pp. 25-50.
Statistical Bureau (2010). Statistical Handbook of Japan 2010. Tokyo: Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications, available at 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/handbook/pdf/c02cont.pdf. 
Statistical Bureau (2011). Summary of the March 2011 Survey Results. Tokyo: 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications, available at 
http://www.stat.go.jp/english/data/roudou/154.htm. 
Tabb, William K. (1995). The Postwar Japanese System. New York: Oxford 
University Press.
Tamadori, Oshima (2010): Foreigner suffrage opponents rally, Conservative 
politicians express outrage ad DPJ plan. Japan Times, 2010/04/18, available 
at http://search.japantimes.co.jp/cgi-bin/nn20100418a1.html.
Thomson, Christopher S. (2003). Depopulation in rural Japan: “Population 
Politics” in Towa-cho. In J. Traphagan and J. Knight (eds.), Demographic 
change and the family in Japan's aging society, Albany: State University of 
New York, pp. 89-106.
Toyota, Mika (2008): Care for the elderly: Family duty or paid service. In S. 
Yamashita et al (eds.), Transnational Migration in East Asia, Osaka: 
116
National Museum of Ethnology, pp. 163-72.
Traphagan, John W. (2003). Contesting Coresidence: Women, In-Laws, and 
Health Care in Rural Japan. In J. Traphagan and J. Knight (eds.), 
Demographic change and the family in Japan's aging society, Albany: State 
University of New York, pp. 203-26.
Tsuda, Takeyuki (2003). Strangers in the Ethnic Homeland. New York: Columbia 
University Press.
Tsuda, Takeyuki (2008). Crossing Ethnic Boundaries: Japanese Brazilian Return 
Migrants and the Ethnic Challenge of Japan’s Newest Immigrant Minority. 
In N. Graburn, J. Ertl, and R. K. Tierney, (eds.), Multiculturalism in the New 
Japan. New York: Berghahn, pp. 117-38.
United Nations Population Division (2001): Replacement Migration: Is It a  
Solution to Declining and Ageing Populations? New York: United Nations 
Publication, available at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/ReplMigED/Japan.pdf. 
Weiner, Michael (1994). Race and migration in imperial Japan. London: 
Routledge.
Weiner, Michael (2003). Japan in the age of migration. In M. Douglass and G. 
Roberts (eds.), Japan and Global Migration, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, pp. 52-69.
White, Stanley and Rie Ishiguro (2011). Fitch cuts Japan credit rating outlook to 
negative. Reuters, 2011/05/28, available at 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/05/28/us-japan-economy-fitch-
117
idUSTRE74Q1QQ20110528. 
Wood, Christopher (1993). The bubble economy: The Japanese economic 
collapse. Tokyo: Tuttle.
World Economic Forum (2010). Stimulating Economies through Fostering Talent 
Mobility. Geneva: World Economic Forum, available at 
http://www.bcg.ru/documents/file41189.pdf.
Yamanaka, Keiko (2008). Japan as a country of immigration: Two decades after 
an influx of immigrant workers. In S. Yamashita et al. (eds.), Transnational  
Migration in East Asia, Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology, pp. 187-96.
Yamashita, Shinji et al. (eds.) (2008). Transnational Migration in East Asia:  
Japan in a Comparative Focus. Osaka: National Museum of Ethnology.
Yamawaki, Keizo (2003). Foreign Workers in Japan: A Historical Perspective. In 
M. Douglass and G. Roberts (eds.), Japan and Global Migration: Foreign 
Workers and the Advent of a Multicultural Society, Honolulu: University of 
Hawaii Press, pp. 38-51.
Young, Louise (1998). Japan’s Total Empire: Manchuria and the Culture of  
Wartime Imperialism. Berkeley: University of California Press.
118
Appendices
Appendix 1. Pregnancy rates, by age group (1955-2005)
Source: Sato et al. (2008: 6).
119
Appendix 2. Proportion of married couples who have had concerns about infertility
Source: Sato et al. (2008: 13).
120
Appendix 3. Proportion of sexlessness among married couples by age group
Source: Sato et al. (2008: 14).
121
Appendix 4. Actual and projected population of Japan – Medium, high and low fertility (with 
medium mortality) variants –
Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 88).
122
Appendix 5. Trends in the number of major three age groups – Medium fertility (with medium 
mortality) variant –
Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 89).
123
Appendix 6. Trends in the proportion of major three age groups – Medium fertility (with medium 
mortality) variant –
Source: Kaneko et al (2008: 89).
124
Appendix 7. Projected Total Population by Prefecture
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 10).
125
Appendix 8. Index of Projected Total Population by Prefecture (2005 = 100)
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 11).
126
Appendix 9. Projected Population Growth Rate by Prefecture
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 11).
127
Appendix 10. Projected Young Population by Prefecture
Source: Nishioka et al (2011: 16).
128
Appendix 11. Rate of Age-specific Population to Total by Prefecture: Young 
Population
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 17).
129
Appendix 12. Projected Working Age Population by Prefecture
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 18).
130
Appendix 13. Rate of Age-specific Population to Total by Prefecture: Working 
Age Population
Source: Nishioka et al. (2011: 19).
131
Appendix 14. Projected Elderly Population by Prefecture
Source: Nishioka et al (2011: 20).
132
Appendix 15. Rate of Age-specific Population to Total by Prefecture: Elderly Population
Source: Nishioka et al (2011: 22).
133
Appendix 16. Population Indicators For Japan By Period Of Each Scenario
Source: United Nations Population Division (2001: 55).
134
Appendix 17. Trends in the proportion of elderly – Medium, high and low fertility (with medium 
mortality) variants –
Source: Kaneko et al. (2008: 88).
135
Appendix 18. Number of foreign nationals entering Japan by gender and age (2009)
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 4).
136
Appendix 19. Changes in the number of new arrivals by the status of residence for employment 
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 8).
137
Appendix 20. Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals and its percentage of the total 
population in Japan
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 22).
138
Appendix 21. Changes in the number of registered foreign nationals by major nationality 
(place of origin)
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 23).
139
Appendix 22. Changes in the estimated number of overstayers by major nationality 
(place of origin)
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 38).
140
Appendix 23. Changes in the estimated number of overstayers by major nationality 
(place of origin) 
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 38).
141
Appendix 24. Changes in the number of cases of illegal work by nationality (place of origin)
Source: Immigration Bureau (2010: 44).
142
